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Abstract
An important disconnect in the news driven view of the business cycle formalized
by Beaudry and Portier (2004), is the lack of agreement between diﬀerent—VAR
and DSGE—methodologies over the empirical plausibility of this view. We argue
that this disconnect can be largely resolved once we augment a standard DSGE
model with a ﬁnancial channel that provides ampliﬁcation to news shocks. Both
methodologies suggest news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy to
be signiﬁcant drivers of U.S. business cycles in the post-Greenspan era (1990-2011),
explaining as much as 50% of the forecast error variance in hours worked in cyclical
frequencies.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by the U.S. investment boom–bust episode of the 1990s, news shocks about
future total factor productivity (TFP) have been proposed as a potentially important
source of ﬂuctuations (Beaudry and Portier (2004), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)). How-
ever, conﬂicting estimates in the literature, question the empirical plausibility of the
“news” view of ﬂuctuations. In the context of Vector autoregressive (VAR) methodologies,
Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Beaudry and Lucke (2010) ﬁnd that TFP news shocks
are important drivers of business cycles, while Barsky and Sims (2011) and Forni et al.
(2012) ﬁnd they are not. The estimated DSGE methodology (Fujiwara et al. (2011),
Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)), ﬁnd them to be negli-
gible sources of ﬂuctuations. In this paper we show that in the post–Greenspan era
(1990-2011), diﬀerent empirical methodologies, namely DSGE and VAR, yield a uniﬁed
answer that provides strong support for the “news” view. The essential element is a
strong link between ﬁnancial markets and real activity that results in ampliﬁcation of
news shocks.
We revisit the VAR evidence. Figure 1 shows impulse responses of key macro ag-
gregates to a favorable (permanent) TFP news shock obtained from a ﬁve variable VAR
based on the Barsky and Sims (2011) methodology. We document two new facts. First,
the corporate bond spread declines signiﬁcantly on impact and anticipates future move-
ments in TFP. Second, and quite importantly, in the sample we examine, good news
about future TFP generate a boom.1
RBC type (as proposed in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)) and New Keynesian (NK)
models (see Christiano et al. (2008), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)) can in principle gener-
1This ﬁnding stands in contrast to results reported in Barsky and Sims (2011) who ﬁnd that good news
about TFP, over the sample 1960-2007, generate recessions. In on–going work (Korobilis and Tsoukalas
(2013)), we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that TFP news shock may have been more relevant for business
cycles in the last two and a half decades. Speciﬁcally, we detect a structural break in the impulse
responses of a TFP news shock that occurs in the mid-1980s. We ﬁnd TFP news to be contractionary
in a pre-1982 sample (1960-1981), but expansionary in a post-1982 (1982-2012) sample, thus helping to
explain those diﬀerences. The sample used in Barsky and Sims (2011) contains both sub-samples and
we conjecture that the early sample has more inﬂuence on the impulse responses.
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ate a boom following good news about TFP. However, in those models, absent ﬁnancial
frictions, there is no role for risk premiums as reﬂected in corporate bond spreads. This
does not square with the VAR evidence presented above. It follows that the lack of
variation in this ﬁnancial indicator predicted by standard models, (a) eliminates trans-
mission channels that link ﬁnancial markets with real activity and (b) ignores potentially
useful information that can help in the identiﬁcation of TFP news shocks. A growing
literature argues that corporate bond markets provide informative signals about future
fundamentals (Gilchrist et al. (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), Philippon (2009)).
This paper proposes a model that links (a) and (b).
We augment a two sector NK model with a ﬁnancial channel featuring leverage con-
straints as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (henceforth
GK).2 The model features a ﬁnal goods (consumption) and a capital goods (investment)
sector with (diﬀerent) sector speciﬁc technologies. The ﬁnal goods sector buys goods from
the capital goods sector, acting as a demand source for the latter. The model permits
examining sectoral co-movement, a salient feature of the business cycle, but also a more
demanding challenge for macroeconomic models (see Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998),
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)) to pass, thus serving as a stricter test for the credibility
of the “news” view.3 Empirically, the model is motivated by the positive correlation be-
tween the relative price of investment and various measures of activity reported in Table
1, which strongly suggests the presence of at least two shocks aﬀecting the relative price.4
At a minimum, in our two sector framework, the relative price of investment can be
aﬀected by both sector speciﬁc technologies.
We estimate the model (using Bayesian techniques) in a post–Greenspan U.S. sample
(1990-2011), allowing for many sources of uncertainty (including ﬁnancial shocks) consid-
ered in the literature, using real, nominal and ﬁnancial data (corporate bond spreads and
2Recent evidence (see Adrian et al. (2010), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)) highlighting the important
role of intermediaries—especially in the post 1990s—in aﬀecting the ﬂow of credit and determination of
asset prices motivates the GK framework in our analysis.
3See Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) for evidence on sectoral co-movement.
4In one sector models, the correlation is predicted to be strongly negative since only investment
speciﬁc technology aﬀects the relative price of investment (see Fisher (2006) for an illustration).
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bank equity). Our ﬁndings suggest news about the future growth prospects of the econ-
omy can explain a large fraction of business cycles. They account for approximately 37%,
31%, 50%, 30% of the variance in output, investment, hours worked and consumption
respectively, in business cycle frequencies. They also account for signiﬁcant shares of the
variance in nominal and ﬁnancial variables. The majority of the shares reported above
are accounted for by a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock, which acts as a demand
shock in the model. Following the anticipation of a future permanent increase in its own
TFP, the ﬁnal goods (consumption) sector demands capital goods from the investment
sector, and the latter responds by hiring more hours worked to satisfy demand, bidding
up the price of investment goods and the price of capital. Financing the demand for
capital is facilitated by intermediaries which face a leverage constraint tied to their eq-
uity. A higher price of capital boosts equity capital, relaxes the constraint and stimulates
more lending, in turn providing a source of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation. The ﬁnancial channel
we evaluate is consistent with the motivating facts discussed above. In the model, the
corporate bond spread declines, and activity rises following an anticipated change in the
future productivity of capital. When the model is taken to the data, the transmission
favored is one in which investment demand drives the cycle, consistent with the “news”
view of ﬂuctuations (Beaudry and Portier (2004)).
We then investigate whether the proposed ﬁnancial channel can bring in line DSGE
and VAR methodologies over the empirical importance of news shocks. To accomplish
this, we undertake three comparisons. First, a comparison of the DSGE based and VAR
based impulse response functions to a TFP news shock. Both methodologies predict a
statistically signiﬁcant expansion of hours, consumption, output and investment and a
decline in the corporate bond spread to an expected future TFP improvement. Second,
a comparison of the shares in forecast error variance of key macro aggregates accounted
for by the TFP news shock. We ﬁnd those shares to be quite similar across the two
methodologies. Third, we investigate whether the empirical VAR responses following the
news shock, can be replicated by responses of VARs estimated on artiﬁcial model samples
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(assuming the DSGE model to be the data generating process), and we ﬁnd this to be the
case for the majority of the empirical VAR responses examined. These ﬁndings suggest
both methodologies produce a consistent assessment of TFP news shocks that supports
them as a signiﬁcant driver of ﬂuctuations in the post–Greenspan era.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the importance of news shocks for
aggregate ﬂuctuations and highlights a new—ﬁnancial—channel that can (i) generate
signiﬁcant real eﬀects of news shocks and (ii) provide reconciliation between DSGE and
VAR methodologies. A related ﬁnancial channel is emphasized in Gunn and Johri (2013)
who investigate the role of news in the eﬃciency and innovation of intermediation in
the ﬁnancial system. This type of news is shown to be able to generate the boom-bust
cycle in liquidity and economic activity observed during the Great Recession. Recent
work in Christiano et al. (2012), point to news shocks in the riskiness of the corporate
sector that propagate and can be identiﬁed, as in our model, having distinct implications
about ﬁnancial prices and quantities, through the ﬁnancial sector. Other recent empirical
work, that supports the “news” view includes, among others, Alexopoulos (2011) and
Leduc and Sill (2013), while diﬀerent propagation channels of news shocks are explored in
Beaudry and Portier (2007), Karnizova (2010), Gunn and Johri (2011), Walentin (2012),
Theodoridis and Zanetti (2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy.
Section 3 describes the estimation methodology, data, and discusses estimation results.
Section 4 quantiﬁes the importance of news shocks as driving forces behind ﬂuctuations
while Section 5 discusses the propagation of TFP news shocks. Section 6 discusses the
relation with VAR–based ﬁndings. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Two Sector Model
The sectors in the model produce consumption and investment goods. The latter are
used as capital inputs in each sectors’ production process, while the former enter only into
4
households utility functions. The model is suﬃciently symmetric and nests a one sector
NK model once we assume (a), that capital is immediately mobile across sectors (b), the
investment sector is perfectly competitive and (c), adopt an appropriate re-normalization
of TFP.5
Households consume, save in interest bearing deposits and supply labor on a monop-
olistically competitive labor market. A continuum of sector speciﬁc intermediate goods
ﬁrms produce distinct investment and consumption goods using labor and capital ser-
vices. They are subject to sector speciﬁc Calvo contracts when setting prices. Capital
producers use investment goods and existing capital to produce new capital goods. Fi-
nancial intermediaries collect deposits from households and ﬁnance capital acquisitions.
A monetary policy authority controls the nominal interest rate.
2.1 Intermediate and ﬁnal goods production
Intermediate goods in the consumption sector are produced by a monopolist according
to the production function,
Ct(i) = max
n
At(LC;t(i))
1 ac(KC;t(i))ac   AtV
ac
1 ai
t FC ; 0
o
:
Intermediate goods in the investment sector are produced by a monopolist according to
the production function,
It(i) = max
n
Vt(LI;t(i))
1 ai(KI;t(i))ai   V
1
1 ai
t FI ; 0
o
;
where Kx;t(i) and Lx;t(i) denote the amount of capital services and labor services rented
by ﬁrm i in sector x = C; I and ac; ai 2 (0; 1) denote capital shares in production.6 The
variable At denotes the (non-stationary) level of TFP in the consumption sector and its
5Recent work by Basu et al. (2010) measuring sector speciﬁc technical change with a growth account-
ing methodology and annual industry data, ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence against summarizing technology
with a single aggregate index, consistent with our analysis.
6Fixed costs of production, FC ; FI > 0, ensure that proﬁts are zero along a non-stochastic bal-
anced growth path and allow us to dispense with the entry and exit of intermediate good producers
(Christiano et al. (2005)). The ﬁxed costs are assumed to grow at the same rate as output in the con-
sumption and investment sector to ensure that they do not become asymptotically negligible.
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growth rate, zt = ln

At
At 1

, follows the process,
zt = (1  z)ga + zzt 1 + "zt ; (1)
Similarly, Vt is the (non-stationary) level of TFP in the investment sector and its growth
rate, vt = ln

Vt
Vt 1

follows the process,
vt = (1  v)gv + vvt 1 + "vt ; (2)
The parameters ga and gv are the steady state growth rates of the two TFP processes
above and z; v 2 (0; 1) determine their persistence.
News shocks. We introduce a richer information structure with respect to the
sectoral TFP processes. Speciﬁcally, we assume the respective innovation in the processes,
(1) and (2), above consist of two components,
"zt = "
z
t;0 + "
z
t;news; "
v
t = "
v
t;0 + "
v
t;news;
where the ﬁrst component, "xt;0, is unanticipated and the second component, "xt;news, x =
z; v is anticipated or news. For example, Alexopoulos (2011) documents, people receive
information (or news) in advance of the actual realization of technology innovations.7
News can be anticipated several quarters ahead so that,
"xt;news 
HX
h=1
"xt h;h; x = z; v
where "xt h;h, x = z; v is advanced information (or news) received by agents in period
t   h (equivalently h periods ahead) about the innovation that aﬀects sectoral TFP in
period t. H is the maximum horizon over which agents can receive advance information
(anticipation horizon). It is assumed that the anticipated and unanticipated components
for sector x = C; I and horizon h = 0; 1; : : : ; H are i:i:d: with N(0; 2z;t h), N(0; 2v;t h)
and uncorrelated across sector, horizon and time. Note, the process above also allows for
revisions in expectations. In other words, information received t h periods in advance can
later be revised by updated information received at t h+1; :::t 1, or by the unanticipated
component, "vt;0; "zt;0 at time t. This implies news received at any anticipation horizon may
7News shocks are introduced in a similar way as for example in Davis (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Fujiwara et al. (2011).
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only be partially (or fail to) materialize.
The intermediate goods producers also make a pricing decision under Calvo (1983)
contracts which, for space considerations, is described in Appendix C.
Final goods, Ct and It, in the consumption and investment sector respectively, are
produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms combining a continuum—Ct(i) and It(i)—of
intermediate goods, according to the technology,
Ct =
"Z 1
0
(Ct(i))
1
1+Cp;t di
#1+Cp;t
; It =
"Z 1
0
(It(i))
1
1+Ip;t di
#1+Ip;t
;
The elasticities Cp;t and Ip;t are the time varying price markup over marginal cost. They
are assumed to follow an AR(1) process, log(1+xp;t) = (1 xp) log(1+xp)+xp log(1+
xp;t 1) + "
x
p;t, with persistence xp 2 (0; 1) and "xp;t (i.e. mark-up shock) which is i:i:d:
N(0; 2xp) (for x = C; I). As is standard in NK models, prices of ﬁnal goods are CES
aggregates of intermediate good prices. Details about these prices and the processes for
the mark-up shocks are given in Appendix C.
2.2 Households
Households consist of two member types, workers (relative size 1 f) and bankers (relative
size f). Workers supply (specialized) labor, indexed by j, and earn wages while bankers
manage a ﬁnancial intermediary. Both member types return their respective earnings
back to the household. This set-up is identical to Gertler and Karadi (2011) except for
the fact that workers have monopoly power in setting wages. The household maximizes,
E0
1X
t=0
tbt
"
ln(Ct   hCt 1)  '(LC;t(j) + LI;t(j))
1+
1 + 
#
;  2 (0; 1); ' > 0;  > 0;
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator,  is the discount factor and h is the
degree of (external) habit formation. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity is denoted
by , while ' is a free parameter which allows to calibrate total labor supply in the steady
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state.8 The variable bt is a intertemporal preference shock. It is assumed to follow the
stochastic process, log bt = b log bt 1 + "bt , where b 2 (0; 1) and "bt is i:i:d N(0; 2b ). The
household’s ﬂow budget constraint (in consumption units) is,
Ct +
Bt
PC;t
 Wt(j)
PC;t
(LC;t(j) + LI;t(j)) +Rt 1
Bt 1
PC;t
  Tt
PC;t
+
	t(j)
PC;t
+
t
PC;t
;
where Bt is holdings of risk free bank deposits, 	t is the net cash ﬂow from household’s
portfolio of state contingent securities, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Rt the (gross) nominal inter-
est rate paid on deposits and t is the net proﬁt accruing to households from ownership
of all ﬁrms. Notice above, the wage rate, Wt, is identical across sectors due to perfect
labor mobility.
Wage setting. Each household j 2 [0; 1] supplies specialized labor, Lxt(j), x = C; I,
monopolistically as in Erceg et al. (2000). A large number of competitive “employment
agencies” aggregate this specialized labor into a homogenous labor input which is sold
to intermediate goods producers in a competitive market. The wage decision details are
described in Appendix C.
2.3 Capital goods production
Capital services producers. These agents purchase—using funds from intermediaries—
physical capital from physical capital producers (described below), transform it to capi-
tal services (by choosing the utilization rate), which they rent—in perfectly competitive
markets—to intermediate goods produces earning a rental rate equal to RKx;t=PC;t per unit
of capital. They sell the un-depreciated portion of capital at the end of period t + 1 at
price Qx;t+1 to physical capital producers.9 The utilization rate, ux;t, transforms physical
8Consumption is not indexed by (j) because the existence of state contingent securities ensures that
in equilibrium, consumption and asset holdings are the same for all households.
9The price of capital, equivalent to Tobin’s marginal Q, Qx;t =
x;t
t
, where t, x;t, are the lagrange
multipliers on the households’ budget constraint, and capital accumulation constraint respectively.
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capital into capital services according to
Kx;t = ux;t
K
x;t
Kx;t 1; x = C; I:
and incurs a cost denoted by ax(ux;t) per unit of capital. This function has the properties
that in the steady state u = 1, ax(1) = 0 and x  a00x(1)a0x(1) , denotes the cost elasticity.
In the transformation above, we allow for a capital quality shock (as in Gertler and Karadi
(2011)), Kx;t, and assume it evolves according to log Kx;t = K ;x log Kx;t 1 + "
K
x;t where
K ;x 2 (0; 1) and "
K
x;t is i:i:d N(0; 2K ), with x = C; I. This disturbance shifts the
demand for capital and directly aﬀects its value—equivalently the value of assets held
by intermediaries since they provide ﬁnance for capital acquisitions. For this reason we
interpret it as a ﬁnancial shock.10
These producers solve,
max
ux;t+1

RKx;t+1
PC;t+1
ux;t+1
K
x;t+1
Kx;t   ax(ux;t+1)Kx;t+1 Kx;tAt+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1

x = C; I
Total receipts of capital services producers in period t+ 1 are equal to,
RBx;t+1Qx;t Kx;t;
with
RBx;t+1 =
RKx;t+1
Px;t+1
Kx;t+1ux;t+1 +Qx;t+1
K
x;t+1(1  x)  ax(ux;t+1)Kx;t+1At+1V
ac 1
1 ai
t+1
Qx;t
(3)
where RBx;t+1 is the real rate of return on capital and x is the sectoral depreciation
rate. Since these agents ﬁnance their purchase of capital at the end of each period with
funds from ﬁnancial intermediaries (to be described below), RBx;t+1 is the stochastic return
earned by ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Physical capital production. Capital producers in sector x = C; I, use a fraction
of investment goods from ﬁnal goods producers and undepreciated capital from capital
services producers to produce new capital goods, subject to investment adjustment costs
10Recently this type of exogenous variation to the value of capital has enjoyed increasing popularity in
macroeconomic models. Other studies that include this type of shock include for example Gourio (2012),
Sannikov and Brunnermeier (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler et al. (2011).
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as proposed by Christiano et al. (2005). Solving their optimization problem yields a
standard capital accumulation equation,11
Kx;t = (1  x)Kx;t Kx;t 1 +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t; x = C; I: (4)
2.4 Financial sector
Financial intermediaries use deposits from households and their own equity capital to
ﬁnance the acquisitions of capital by capital services producers. The implementation of
ﬁnancial intermediaries is based on Gertler and Karadi (2011), so we only brieﬂy describe
it here (Appendix C provides all the equations), focusing on the essential mechanics.12
These can be described with three key equations. The balance sheet identity, the demand
for assets that links equity capital with the value of assets (physical capital), and ﬁnally,
the evolution of equity capital.
The balance sheet (in nominal terms) of a branch that lends in sector x = C; I, is,
Qx;tPC;tSx;t = Nx;tPC;t +Bx;t;
where Sx;t denotes the quantity of ﬁnancial claims on capital services producers held by
the intermediary and Qx;t denotes the price per unit of claim. The variable Nx;t denotes
equity capital (or wealth) at the end of period t, Bx;t are households deposits and PC;t is
the consumption sector price level.
Financial intermediaries are limited from inﬁnitely borrowing household funds by a
moral hazard/costly enforcement problem, where bankers can steal funds and transfer
11Sector speciﬁc capital implies that installed capital is immobile between sectors. Our assumption
of sector speciﬁc capital is motivated by evidence in Ramey and Shapiro (2001) who report signiﬁcant
costs of reallocating capital across sectors. Two sector models with sector speciﬁc capital include, among
others, Boldrin et al. (2001), Ireland and Schuh (2008), Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) and Papanikolaou
(2011). Limited factor mobility is shown to be able to correct many counterfactual predictions of one
sector models with respect to both aggregate quantities and asset returns. For example, Boldrin et al.
(2001) show it can rationalize the equity premium puzzle, co-movement of sectoral inputs over the
business cycle, the inverted leading indicator property of interest rates.
12We interpret the ﬁnancial sector as a single intermediary with two independent branches, each
specializing in providing ﬁnancing to one sector only, where the probability of lending specialization is
equal across sectors and independent across time.
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them to households (see Appendix C for detailed exposition). Intermediaries maximize
expected terminal wealth, i.e. the discounted sum of future equity capital. The moral
hazard problem introduces an endogenous leverage constraint, limiting the bank’s
ability to acquire assets. This is formalized in the equation that determines the demand
for assets,
Qx;tSx;t = %x;tNx;t: (5)
In the equation above, the value of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends
on equity capital, Nx;t, scaled by the leverage ratio, %x;t.13 With %x;t > 1, the leverage
constraint magniﬁes changes in equity capital on the demand for assets. Higher demand
for capital goods for example, which raises the price of capital, increases equity capital
(through the balance sheet identity) which in turn brings about further changes in the
demand for assets by intermediaries pushing the price of capital further. This ampliﬁca-
tion turns out to be the key reason for the important role of news shocks we recover from
the estimated model.
Finally, the evolution of equity capital is described by the following law of motion
for equity capital,
Nx;t+1 =
 
B[(R
B
x;t+1C;t  Rt)%x;t +Rt]
Nx;t
C;t+1
+$Qx;t+1Sx;t+1

:
where, B is the exit rate of bankers, $ denotes the fraction of assets given to new
bankers and C;t is consumption goods inﬂation. It is useful to deﬁne the expected
(nominal) excess return (or risk premium) on assets earned by banks as
RSx;t = R
B
x;t+1C;t+1  Rt; x = C; I: (6)
The presence of the ﬁnancial intermediation constraint in equation (5), implies a non-
negative excess return (equivalently wedge between the expected return on capital and
the risk free interest rate), which varies over time with the equity capital of intermediaries.
Financing capital acquisitions by capital services producers. Capital services
13The leverage ratio (bank’s intermediated assets to equity) is a function of the marginal gains of
expanding assets (holding equity constant), expanding equity (holding assets constant), and the gain
from diverting assets.
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producers issue Sx;t claims equal to units of physical capital acquired, Kx;t, priced at Qx;t.
Then, by arbitrage the following constraint holds,
Qx;t Kx;t = Qx;tSx;t;
where the left-hand side stands for the value of physical capital acquired and the right-
hand side denotes the value of claims against this capital.14 Using the assumptions in
Gertler and Karadi (2011) we can interpret these claims as one period state-contingent
bonds which allows interpreting the risk premium deﬁned in equation (6) as a corporate
bond spread.
2.5 Monetary policy and market clearing
The nominal interest rate Rt, set by the monetary authority follows a feedback rule,
Rt
R
=
Rt 1
R
Rhc;t
c
 Yt
Yt 1
Y i1 R
mp;t; R 2 (0; 1);  > 0; Y > 0;
where R is the steady state (gross) nominal interest rate and (Yt=Yt 1) is the gross
growth rate in real GDP. The interest rate responds to deviations of consumption goods
(gross) inﬂation from its target level, and real GDP growth and is subject to a monetary
policy IID shock mp;t. GDP (in consumption units) is deﬁned as,
Yt = Ct +
PI;t
PC;t
It +Gt;
whereGt denotes government spending (in consumption units) which we assume to evolve
exogenously according to Gt =

1  1
gt

Yt, with, log gt = (1  g) log g + g log gt 1 + "gt
where g 2 (0; 1) and "gt is i:i:d: N(0; 2g). The sectoral resource constraints are stated in
Appendix C.
14We assume—in line with Gertler and Karadi (2011)—there are no frictions in the process of in-
termediation between non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and banks. Notice the assumptions above imply ﬁnancial
intermediaries assume all the risk when lending to capital services producers.
12
3 Data and Methodology
We estimate the model using quarterly U.S. data (1990 Q2 - 2011 Q1) on eleven real,
nominal and ﬁnancial market variables. Our ﬁnancial observables consist of sectoral
(non-ﬁnancial) corporate bond spreads and a publicly available measure of intermediaries’
equity capital reported by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. We
use sector speciﬁc spreads for investment grade corporate bonds issued by non-ﬁnancial
companies that are actively traded in the secondary market. We focus on investment
grade issues (source: Datastream) motivated by the evidence in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012). Companies who are investment grade issuers are also less likely to be facing
constraints in the intermediation process, consistent with the assumptions of the model.
The average rating range/duration in our sample is A- to BBB+/7.5 years, A- to BBB+/7
years, in the consumption, investment sector respectively. Our bond spread indicators
appear to be quite informative, especially compared to other popular indicators—such
as Baa spread, S&P 500 return—for future company fundamentals, as captured by the
(I/B/E/S) long term earnings forecast.15 Speciﬁcally, the correlation of (i) our average
spread indicator, (ii) Baa spread, (iii) S&P 500 real return with the (I/B/E/S) earnings
forecast is,  0:60,  0:27,  0:04, respectively, where  indicates signiﬁcance at the 5%
level. These correlations suggest, our spread indicators may have the ability to strongly
anticipate future changes in corporate fundamentals.
The vector of observables we use in the estimation is given as,
Yt =

 log Yt; logCt; log It; logWt; C;t; I;t; logLt; Rt; R
S
C;t; R
S
I;t; logNt

;
where  denotes the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator and we demean the data prior to esti-
mation. In the vector above, Yt; Ct; It;Wt; C;t; I;t; Lt; Rt; RSC;t; RSI;t; Nt, denote, output
(GDP), consumption, investment, real wage, consumption sector inﬂation, investment
sector inﬂation, hours worked, nominal interest rate, consumption sector bond spread,
investment sector bond spread and bank equity respectively. Appendix B describes the
15The latter was shown in Cummins et al. (2006) to capture future corporate fundamentals that drive
U.S. corporate investment.
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data sources and methods in detail.
Prior and posterior distributions. A number of fairly standard parameters are
calibrated and are summarized in Table 2 (described in detail in Appendix A.1). For
the parameters we estimate we use prior distributions that conform to the assumptions
in Justiniano et al. (2010) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2012). We consider four and eight
quarter ahead sector speciﬁc TFP news. This choice is guided by the desire to economize
on the state space and consequently on parameters to be estimated while being ﬂexible
enough such that the news process is able to accommodate revisions in expectations. Sim-
ilar news horizons are considered by Christiano et al. (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2012). The prior means assumed for the TFP news
components are in line with the studies mentioned above and imply that the sum of the
variance of news components is at most one half of the variance of the corresponding
unanticipated component. We undertake robustness checks on the weight of the priors
in section 4. We use the Bayesian methodology to estimate the parameters. Table 3
reports information on prior, the posterior mean and the 10% to 90% probability interval
of estimated parameters. Overall, the estimates are broadly consistent with earlier stud-
ies using one sector models, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)
and Justiniano et al. (2010), and we do not discuss them in detail. One ﬁnding we draw
attention to, is the degree of price stickiness estimated for the investment sector. The
Calvo probability is estimated at 0.70. This implies that one of the restrictions, namely
a perfectly competitive investment sector, required to write the two sector model as a
particular one sector model (as in Justiniano et al. (2010), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012))
is not satisﬁed.
Identiﬁcation. We use two tests to check for identiﬁcation of the model parameters,
proposed by, (i) Iskrev (2010) and (ii) Koop et al. (2012), the latter being a more powerful
test in cases of weak identiﬁcation. Both tests indicate that the parameters are well
identiﬁed (see Appendix A.3 for the details).
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4 Variance Decompositions
In this section we document the relative contribution of the model’s disturbances in
accounting for ﬂuctuations. We discuss results from a decomposition at the frequency
domain, focussing on business cycle frequencies.16 Table 4 reports our ﬁndings.
News shocks. TFP news shocks account for approximately 37%, 30%, 31%, 50%
of the variance in output, consumption, investment and hours worked respectively, with
the majority of these shares accounted for by consumption speciﬁc TFP news (see next
section for a description of the propagation). Moreover, they account for a signiﬁcant
fraction in the variance of both corporate bond spread series, exceeding 40%, suggesting
a signiﬁcant amount of variation in the latter may reﬂect future fundamentals. They also
account for over 50% in the variance of the nominal interest rate, and between, approx-
imately, 34% to 41% of the variance in the sectoral inﬂation rates. Investment speciﬁc
TFP news components account for signiﬁcantly smaller variance shares in all observables,
namely, less than 10% (except the variance share in the real wage, approximately 17%).
The ﬁnding that investment speciﬁc news shocks are of lesser quantitative importance
eﬀectively rests on the property that these shocks signal future changes in the supply not
demand for capital goods. An expected improvement in the productivity of the capital
goods sector, makes installed capital less valuable and generates a decline of capital prices
on impact, severing the ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation channel which rests on procyclical capital
prices. Econometrically, these shocks fail to replicate data moments, among these, the
pro-cyclicality of the relative price of investment and the counter-cyclicality of corporate
bond spreads.
The importance of consumption speciﬁc TFP news shocks. Why do consump-
tion speciﬁc TFP news shocks become so important in accounting for the variance in the
data, in the presence of multiple sources of disturbances? Relative to other disturbances,
they generate the right type of co-movements between aggregate quantities and prices
16For space considerations we summarize results that are of most interest to our discussion and report
a detailed decomposition on all shocks in Table 7 in Appendix A.2.
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(see Section 5 for an exposition of the transmission). More speciﬁcally, (a) procyclical
movements in quantities, (b) countercyclical movements in corporate bond spreads and
a set of cross correlations of the latter with real macro aggregates in line with those
in the data. An illustration of the facts above can be conﬁrmed by examining Figure
2. The Figure presents dynamic correlations among several key variables pertaining to
facts (a) and (b) above, in the data (solid line), model with all shocks active (line with
’+’), model with the dominant TFP news shock only active (and all other shocks set to
zero—line with circles). The dynamic correlations implied by the model simulated with
consumption speciﬁc TFP news shocks only are very similar to the correlations gener-
ated by the model with all shocks active. Moreover, in some dimensions the correlations
implied by the former (e.g. see subplots (1,3)—output growth with hours, (2,2)—output
growth with C sector spread, (3,1)—investment growth with C sector spread, (3,2)—
sectoral bond spreads, (3,3)—hours worked) are extremely well aligned to the empirical
ones, highlighting their importance for the ability of the model to match them so closely.
News shocks with the ﬁnancial channel turned oﬀ. The ﬁndings on the overall
importance of TFP news shocks stand in contrast to earlier DSGE (Fujiwara et al. (2011),
Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)) work, despite many model
similarities. However, the frameworks considered therein do not allow for the link be-
tween the ﬁnancial sector and real activity. We now illustrate the impact of the ﬁnancial
channel on the empirical relevance of TFP news shocks. Table 5 reports the variance
shares accounted for by TFP news shocks from two model speciﬁcations, namely, the
baseline against a simple model estimated with the ﬁnancial channel stripped oﬀ. This
exercise helps to quantify the size of the ampliﬁcation generated by the ﬁnancial channel.
Overall, the quantitative importance of TFP news shocks in the simpler model declines
signiﬁcantly. For example, the contribution of consumption speciﬁc TFP news shocks
in the variance of output declines from approximately 31% in the baseline, to less than
7% in the estimated model without the ﬁnancial channel, whereas the total contribution
of TFP news shocks in the variance of output (hours) declines from 37% (50%) to ap-
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proximately 15% (17%). In the simple model therefore, the empirical role of TFP news
shocks is broadly in line (though somewhat higher) with earlier ﬁndings reported in es-
timated one sector models, such as Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Fujiwara et al. (2011),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012).17 This is not surprising since our estimated two sec-
tor model nests these simpler one sector frameworks. We ﬁnally note, that the baseline
model dominates, in terms of ﬁt, the model without the ﬁnancial sector when both are
estimated on the same dataset (excluding the ﬁnancial variables). The diﬀerence in the
marginal data densities is equal to 12.13 log points in favor of the baseline.
Overall the model suggests, TFP (consumption and investment speciﬁc) shocks, unan-
ticipated and news, account for the majority of the forecast error variance in the data
(see the next to last column in Table 4), thus becoming the dominant source of ﬂuc-
tuations. Investment speciﬁc TFP shocks, in contrast to estimated one sector mod-
els (e.g. Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), Christiano et al.
(2012)), are sizable drivers of ﬂuctuations, broadly consistent with earlier ﬁndings in
Greenwood et al. (2000), Fisher (2006) and Justiniano et al. (2010). The key reason, is
that, in our framework, these shocks are not identiﬁed from the relative price of invest-
ment alone.18 It is also interesting to report that (ad-hoc) wage mark-up or price mark
up shocks play a very limited role. Finally, the contribution of capital quality shocks,
which we interpret as ﬁnancial shocks, is fairly limited, accounting for less than 10% in
the majority of macroeconomic real and nominal series (except consumption), but nev-
ertheless account for shares close to 20% in two out of the three ﬁnancial observables,
consistent with the interpretation we adopt for these shocks.19
17Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) ﬁnd that wage mark-up and prefer-
ence news shocks explain a large share of the variance in the data, especially for hours worked. However,
that these ad-hoc disturbances are found to explain large fractions of the variance in hours worked is not
satisfactory from a structural perspective, because it likely indicates mis-speciﬁcation.
18The relative price of investment in the model is given as, PI;t=PC;t = wedgetAt=Vt, where the wedget,
is a function of price mark-ups and capital labor ratios. The presence of the wedge implies, all shocks
aﬀect this price (Appendix A.6 provides a detailed exposition.) We note, the transmission following an
unanticipated investment speciﬁc shock is qualitatively very similar to that generated from a one sector
model as in Justiniano et al. (2010) so we do not discuss it in detail.
19A positive shock of this type has the property that it raises the price of capital and thus causes a
revaluation of assets in the banks’ portfolios, leading to gains in bank equity and expansion in lending
consistent with this interpretation.
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Robustness. We undertake several robustness exercises to assess the sensitivity
of our results, along four dimensions. First, we allow for a common aggregate TFP
shock, as a source of broad based co-movement, that aﬀects symmetrically both sectors.
Second, we vary the assumptions on prior distributions of shocks in the model, and prior
weights assigned on news shocks. Third, we exclude the most recent “Great Recession”
period, namely, observations from 2008Q1 to 2011Q1, from the estimation sample, to
guard against the possibility that the empirical role of news shocks may be driven by this
recent volatile period, as well as potential misspeciﬁcation of the monetary policy rule
when the policy rate approaches the zero lower bound. Fourth, we add news components
in the non–structural disturbances of the model as in Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). These robustness checks are reported in Appendix A.4.
Brieﬂy, we ﬁnd, in line with our baseline results, consumption speciﬁc TFP news shocks
continue to be signiﬁcant drivers of business cycles along all perturbations described
above.
5 Propagation and ampliﬁcation of consumption spe-
ciﬁc TFP news
In this section, we discuss the model’s impulse responses to a consumption speciﬁc TFP
news shock to better understand the propagation. Figure 3 shows impulse responses
(IRFs) to an anticipated (two year ahead) positive, consumption speciﬁc TFP shock.
The broad aggregates, namely, consumption, investment, and hours worked rise along
with output in anticipation of the future improvement in TFP. The sectoral aggregates
move together with aggregate activity. Thus the shock generates both aggregate and
sectoral co-movement in response to the news shock.20
The two sector structure of the model propagates the shock to the investment sector.
20We have checked that sectoral investment and hours worked exhibit co-movement in the data. We
do not discuss this evidence in detail given that we have not attempted to match data moments from
sectoral hours and investment in the estimation.
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The anticipation that future productivity of capital will be permanently higher in the
consumption sector creates demand for capital goods produced by the investment sector.
The strong demand causes the relative price of investment to rise, consistent with the
procyclicality of the relative price of investment in our sample (see Table 1). Capital
prices rise as well. The price of (consumption sector) capital increases in anticipation of
the expected future improvement in TFP and future productivity of capital. The price
of investment sector capital increases as well: more inputs, including capital speciﬁc to
this sector, will be employed in order to satisfy higher demand for investment goods from
the consumption sector. Thus, both hours worked and investment goods allocated to the
investment sector rise. The key mechanisms that generate co-movement in the broad and
sectoral aggregates are the presence of countercyclical price and wage mark-ups which
shift outward labor demand and labor supply in response of the news shock. One sector
NK models featuring countercyclical mark-ups can generate co-movement in response
to TFP news shocks (see e.g. Christiano et al. (2008)), but in those estimated models
(Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)), TFP news shocks are
found to be very minor sources of business cycles, suggesting mark-ups alone cannot
provide enough ampliﬁcation.21
Importantly, higher capital prices boost bank equity as the value of capital held by
intermediaries rises, causing them to expand ﬁnancing. Sectoral bond spreads decline in
anticipation of the future improvement in TFP, consistent with the time path of capital
prices. Thus, corporate bond spreads signal the future improvement in TFP.22 It is also
interesting to note that both sectoral inﬂation rates and the nominal interest rate rise in
response to this type of TFP news shock. Overall, the TFP news shock has dynamics that
21In the model, the real wage and equilibrium hours both rise on impact, implying an increase in
labor demand. Given the preference speciﬁcation we utilize, which is of the King et al. (1988) type, the
positive TFP news shock implies a negative wealth eﬀect on labor supply. However, this negative wealth
eﬀect is dominated by a strong expansion of labor demand and a rightward shift in labor supply and
equilibrium hours rise. We discus nominal rigidities in more detail in Appendix A.5.
22The sectoral bond spread in the model corresponds to the expected excess return to capital (wedge
between expected return to capital and risk free rate). The expected return to capital (between time
t; t+1) declines (as capital prices are expected to fall) and the risk free rate rises to produce the decline
in the corporate bond spreads shown in the Figure.
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resemble a demand shock, with activity and inﬂation moving in the same direction and the
reaction of the nominal interest rate following the surge in consumption goods inﬂation
is consistent with a conventional view of monetary policy (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler
(2000)), according to which it acts as a stabilizing force that dampens expectation driven
cycles.
Financial intermediation and ampliﬁcation. To illustrate the impact of the
ﬁnancial intermediation channel, we compare the IRFs from the baseline model with the
same set of IRFs from the estimated model without ﬁnancial intermediation, shown in
Figure 4. We show the responses to a positive (eight quarter ahead) consumption speciﬁc
TFP news shock (the size of the shock is normalized to be equal across the two models).23
The Figure demonstrates that ﬁnancial intermediation generates a signiﬁcant ampli-
ﬁcation in real activity, by causing the capital prices to rise more strongly in the baseline
model. With an active leverage constraint, equation (5), gains in intermediaries’ equity
caused by higher capital prices, create a very strong demand for capital, bidding up cap-
ital prices further in comparison to the model version without a ﬁnancial channel. This
strong rise in capital prices, in turn stimulates investment demand, hours worked and
overall activity.
6 Reconciling DSGE and VAR ﬁndings
This section provides a comparison of our DSGE-based with a VAR-based identiﬁca-
tion of a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock. To identify the latter we use the
Barsky and Sims (2011) methodology and estimate a six variable VAR featuring a (utilization-
adjusted) consumption speciﬁc TFP measure, consumption-sector corporate bond spread,
consumption, output, hours and inﬂation in that order.24 In a VAR with the TFP mea-
23We do not show the estimated parameter values from this model speciﬁcation for space considerations,
but are available on request. We note the ampliﬁcation we discuss also obtains when both models are
simulated at the baseline model’s parameter values.
24This methodology is appealing because identiﬁcation rests on very minimal assumptions. The results
are qualitatively similar to a smaller or larger VAR speciﬁcations (e.g. 4-7 variables, including for example
the Michigan conﬁdence indicator measure or using a weighted (taking into account both sectoral) spread
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sure ﬁrst in the ordering, the reduced form innovation serves as the surprise TFP shock,
while the TFP news shock is identiﬁed as the shock orthogonal to the surprise compo-
nent that best explains future movements in TFP over a ﬁnite horizon. We recover the
TFP news shock by maximizing the share of the variance in TFP over horizons from
1 to 10 years. Our choice is guided by the model results, since it implies only surprise
TFP innovations can account for the variance in TFP over the ﬁrst year while TFP news
shocks can aﬀect the variance of (consumption) TFP only after the 1st year. Figure 5
presents the results from the VAR speciﬁcation described above, with the point estimate
and +/- one standard deviation bootstrapped (shaded areas) bands as described in Kilian
(1998). Note, ﬁrst, consistent with the model, TFP begins to rise signiﬁcantly above zero
with a delay of about 10 quarters. Moreover, the VAR identiﬁed TFP news shock, in
line with the model, creates a boom today: output, consumption, and hours increase
signiﬁcantly on impact.25 In addition, the corporate bond spread declines signiﬁcantly
echoing the ﬁnding documented in Figure 1, namely that corporate bond markets antic-
ipate future TFP.26 Investment also rises signiﬁcantly in response to good news about
future TFP (see Figure 6, based on an alternative VAR speciﬁcation). Inﬂation rises
with a delay. To facilitate illustration, in Figure 7 we plot the DSGE model responses
series. The consumption speciﬁc TFP measure is derived from the growth accounting methodology
of Basu et al. (2006), and corrects for unobserved capacity utilization (described in Fernald (2012)).
However, it does not contain all the corrections as in Basu et al. (2006), namely imperfect competition
or reallocation eﬀects.
25We note, the empirical VAR responses in the Figure stand in contrast to Barsky and Sims (2011)
who use an aggregate TFP measure, or Nam and Wang (2012) who use sectoral TFP series like us and
a much longer sample. In Barsky and Sims (2011) (Nam and Wang (2012)), hours and output decline
in anticipation of a favorable aggregate (consumption speciﬁc) TFP news shock. In on-going work
(Korobilis and Tsoukalas (2013)), with time–varying parameter VARs, we document a signiﬁcant and
qualitatively important diﬀerence in the IRFs of output and hours across time, detecting a break that
occurs in the mid-1980s. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that while in a pre–1982 (1960-1982) sample, output and
hours decline signiﬁcantly (on impact) in response to a favorable consumption speciﬁc (or aggregate)
TFP news shock, in a post–1982 (1982-2011) sample, the same variables increase signiﬁcantly on impact
in response to the same two shocks. These ﬁndings seem to be related to the shares of variance of TFP
accounted for by the news shocks at diﬀerent horizons. In the early sample, the bulk of the variance
share of TFP accounted by the news shock obtains in very short horizons, where TFP rises immediately
and strongly, while the opposite is true in the late samples, where TFP exhibits a signiﬁcantly delayed
response.
26We note, that the impulse responses following the consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock are very
similar—both quantitatively and qualitatively—with the corresponding responses reported in Figure 1.
This is due to the fact that the two TFP series, namely, aggregate and consumption speciﬁc TFP, track
each other very closely, with a correlation of 0.98.
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to a 2 year ahead consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock along with the responses from
the estimated VAR (as shown in Figure 5) and simulated responses obtained from VARs
estimated on artiﬁcial samples generated from the model (to be discussed below). The
empirical VAR responses are qualitatively consistent with the model’s responses. There
are some diﬀerences in terms of magnitudes, most notably in the output and inﬂation
response on impact, especially in the ﬁrst periods. Note however each methodology uses
diﬀerent moments from the data to estimate the TFP news component. Nevertheless,
the consistency of VAR and DSGE responses we believe lends credibility to the ﬁnancial
channel we propose.27
How does the quantitative role for TFP news compares across the two methodologies?
Figure 8 provides an answer, focusing on the empirical importance of TFP news for output
and hours. It plots the variance shares accounted for by TFP news shocks, predicted by
(i) the VAR, (ii) baseline DSGE model and (iii) DSGE model estimated without the
ﬁnancial channel (as discussed in section 4). The variance shares predicted by the VAR
and baseline DSGE model are very similar (especially in shorter horizons). For example,
at the 12 quarter horizon, the baseline DGSE predicts 30% (41%) of the forecast error
variance of output (hours worked) attributed to TFP news shocks, very similar to the
variance shares in the same variables obtained from the VAR, equal to 31% (49%). By
contrast, the diﬀerences between the VAR and the model without the ﬁnancial channel
are substantial, in fact the variance shares in the latter are several orders of magnitude
smaller compared to the VAR. Table 6 provides more information on the remaining
variables. In business cycle frequencies (6-32 quarters), the VAR based TFP news shock
(top panel) accounts for between 21%–38% in the variance of consumption, 28%–41%
in the variance of the corporate bond spread, 15%–45% in the variance of investment
and 21% in the variance of inﬂation. The middle panel reports the variance shares from
the (identical) simulated VAR speciﬁcations estimated on the artiﬁcial model samples.
This panel reports the median and (20%, 80%) conﬁdence bands. Interestingly, the shares
27Note, that the VAR, in line with the convention in this literature, also utilizes an observable indicator
of TFP to identify the news shock.
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reported for the empirical VAR are, for the vast majority of horizons and variables, within
the conﬁdence bands generated by the VARs estimated on artiﬁcial data.
We next investigate whether the empirical VAR responses could have been generated
by the model, assuming the latter as the data generating process. To accomplish this, we
generated 1,000 artiﬁcial model samples by drawing parameter values from the posterior
distributions and simulated the model. We then compare the empirical VAR IRFs with
those generated by identical VAR speciﬁcations (along with conﬁdence bands) estimated
on the artiﬁcial model samples.28 Figure 7 shows this comparison for the consumption
speciﬁc TFP news shock. Figure 9 shows the comparison for the aggregate TFP measure,
where in this ﬁgure, the empirical VAR responses are identical to those in Figure 1.29
We observe that for both measures of TFP and in the majority of periods we plot, the
empirical VAR responses are within the conﬁdence bands generated by the simulated
VAR responses taking the model as the data generating process. These ﬁndings overall
suggest both DGSE and VAR methodologies provide a consistent empirical assessment
of TFP news shocks.30
7 Conclusions
The empirical evaluation of the “news” driven view of business cycles has been challenging
on both modelling and econometric front (see Beaudry and Portier (2013)). Considerable
28We have simulated the model over 1084 periods. We construct the level of the resulting time series
and discard all but the last 84 periods to minimize the impact of initial values. Note that the issue of
non-invertibility does not seem to be particularly acute since the simulated VARs seem to pick the model
responses, quite accurately, except for TFP.
29To generate an aggregate TFP measure from the model we take the weighted average of the con-
sumption speciﬁc and investment speciﬁc measures using as weights their output shares, consistent with
the methodology in Fernald (2012). We then use this aggregate measure in the VARs estimated on the
artiﬁcial samples to identify the aggregate TFP news shock.
30We undertake a ﬁnal robustness check. Because a signiﬁcant amount of information for the iden-
tiﬁcation of TFP news shocks is contained in the corporate bond spread series we ﬁnd it informative
to investigate an alternative interpretation. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) argue that innovations in
corporate bond spreads are, to a certain extent, driven by the excess bond premium (EBP), an indicator
of disruptions in the supply of credit that may be orthogonal to corporate fundamentals. We investigate
whether the EBP Granger causes the TFP news shocks. The results from this exercise are clear cut.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the EBP does not Granger cause either of the TFP news shocks
at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The Granger causality tests are carried out with 12 lags.
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disagreement exists between VAR based and DSGE based methodologies on the empir-
ical relevance of this view. DSGE models, despite incorporating model frictions that in
theory allow TFP news shocks to matter, estimate them to be unimportant as sources of
business cycles. VARs often reach diametrically opposite conclusions on their empirical
importance. In this paper we propose and empirically evaluate a ﬁnancial channel that
links in a parsimonious way leveraged lenders, capital prices and real activity in a DSGE
model. When we discipline this channel with information from corporate bond markets,
we ﬁnd that TFP news shocks are important drivers of the U.S. business cycles in the
post-Greenspan era. Importantly, we show that the ﬁnancial channel can bring close in
line the empirical estimates of TFP news shocks from DSGE and VAR methodologies
and thus resolves an important empirical disconnect in the literature.
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Table 1: Correlations: Relative price of investment and economic activity
Hours GDP Investment
Relative Price Investment 0:40 0:35 0:26
Sample is 1990Q2 to 2011Q1.  denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. All
variables are ﬁltered using the HP ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of
1600. The Relative Price of Investment is the chain weighted investment
(gross private domestic investment and consumer durables) deﬂator divided
by the chain weighted consumption (non durables and services) deﬂator.
Hours is for all persons in the non farm business sector. Investment is chain
weighted gross private domestic investment and consumer durables. All
variables are described in Appendix B.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
C 0.025 Consumption sector capital depreciation
I 0.025 Investment sector capital depreciation
ac 0.3 Consumption sector share of capital
aI 0.3 Investment sector share of capital
 0.9974 Discount factor
C 1.006722 Steady state consumption sector quarterly gross inﬂation (percent)
I 1.000245 Steady state investment sector quarterly gross inﬂation (percent)
p 0.15 Steady state price markup
w 0.15 Steady state wage markup
ga 0.141 Steady state C-sector TFP growth (percent quarterly)
gv 0.434 Steady state I-sector TFP growth (percent quarterly)
pi
i
c 0.399 Steady state investment / consumption
G
Y 0.19 Steady state government spending / output
B 0.96 Fraction of bankers that survive
$ 0.0021 Share of assets transferred to new bankers
B 0.69 Fraction of funds bankers can divert
% 5.47 Steady state leverage ratio
RB  R 0.5 Steady state risk premium (percent quarterly)
Notes. , C ; I , ga; gv , pi ic , %, R
B   R are based on sample averages. $ and B are set to be consistent with the
average values of the leverage ratio, %, and RB  R. For further details see the description in Appendix A.1.
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Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Parameter Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Distribution Mean Std. dev. Mean 10% 90%
h Consumption habit Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6275 0.5599 0.6949
 Inverse labour supply elasticity Gamma 2.00 0.75 0.8718 0.2447 1.4893
w Wage Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.6599 0.6196 0.7003
C C-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.7785 0.7465 0.8132
I I-sector price Calvo probability Beta 0.66 0.10 0.7058 0.6334 0.7773
w Wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.1306 0.0581 0.2034
pC C-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.0726 0.0281 0.1139
pI I-sector price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.3033 0.1348 0.4702
I I-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 4.9975 3.3997 6.6080
C C-sector utilization Gamma 5.00 1.00 4.6983 3.0598 6.3562
 Investment adj. cost Gamma 4.00 1.00 2.2881 1.7747 2.7620
 Taylor rule inﬂation Normal 1.70 0.30 1.5864 1.3976 1.7665
R Taylor rule inertia Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8434 0.8191 0.8681
dX Taylor rule output growth Normal 0.25 0.10 0.6822 0.5706 0.7921
Shocks: Persistence
z C-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.7498 0.6973 0.801
v I-sector TFP Beta 0.40 0.20 0.1415 0.0455 0.2328
b Preference Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9136 0.8762 0.9542
e GDP measurement error Beta 0.60 0.20 0.9826 0.9664 0.9993
Cp
C-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.0539 0.0145 0.0919
Ip
I-sector price markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8871 0.8442 0.9337
w Wage markup Beta 0.60 0.20 0.0523 0.0087 0.0945
K ;C C-sector capital quality Beta 0.60 0.20 0.8437 0.8133 0.8765
K ;I I-sector capital quality Beta 0.60 0.20 0.0862 0.0215 0.1471
Shocks: Volatilities
z C-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2 0.1721 0.1288 0.2147
4z C-sector TFP. 4Q ahead news Inv Gamma 0.5/
p
2 2 0.1174 0.0839 0.1521
8z C-sector TFP. 8Q ahead news Inv Gamma 0.5/
p
2 2 0.2014 0.1544 0.2470
v I-sector TFP Inv Gamma 0.50 2 1.8718 1.5932 2.1517
4v I-sector TFP. 4Q ahead news Inv Gamma 0.5/
p
2 2 0.2959 0.1090 0.4712
8v I-sector TFP. 8Q ahead news Inv Gamma 0.5/
p
2 2 0.7001 0.5282 0.8661
b Preference Inv Gamma 0.10 2 1.4524 1.1644 1.7339
e GDP measurement error Inv Gamma 0.50 2 0.5102 0.4357 0.5794
mp Monetary policy Inv Gamma 0.10 2 0.1204 0.1023 0.1386
Cp
C-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2 0.6045 0.5184 0.6839
Ip
I-sector price markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2 0.2282 0.1647 0.2863
w Wage markup Inv Gamma 0.10 2 0.3689 0.3100 0.4274
K ;C C-sector capital quality Inv Gamma 0.50 2 0.3118 0.2237 0.3948
K ;I I-sector capital quality Inv Gamma 0.50 2 2.4029 2.0458 2.7600
Notes. The posterior distribution of parameters is evaluated numerically using the random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. We simulate the posterior using a sample of 500,000 draws and discard the ﬁrst 100,000 of the draws.
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Table 6: Variance decompositions: TFP news—VARs and DSGE
Horizon
6 12 20 24 32
Empirical VAR (point estimate)
Consumption 0:38 0:32 0:25 0.23 0.21
Output 0:36 0:31 0:25 0.23 0.21
Hours 0:61 0:49 0:33 0.29 0.25
Investment 0:45 0:30 0:21 0.19 0.15
Bond Spread 0:41 0:31 0:30 0.29 0.28
Inﬂation 0:21 0:21 0:21 0.21 0.21
VAR on simulated model data
(medians with [20%,80%] bands)
Consumption 0:36 0:51 0:57 0.58 0.57
[0.11, 0.59] [0.22, 0.74] [0.29, 0.78] [0.30, 0.78] [0.31, 0.79]
Output 0:51 0:53 0:54 0.54 0.54
[0.20, 0.72] [0.23, 0.76] [0.25, 0.74] [0.26, 0.75] [0.27, 0.74]
Hours 0:45 0:41 0:40 0.41 0.41
[0.17, 0.69] [0.18, 0.64] [0.21, 0.62] [0.22, 0.62] [0.23, 0.61]
Investment 0:39 0:37 0:38 0.38 0.39
[0.10, 0.69] [0.14, 0.67] [0.16, 0.65] [0.18, 0.63] [0.19, 0.63]
Bond Spread 0:25 0:27 0:29 0.29 0.30
[0.12, 0.44] [0.13, 0.44] [0.14, 0.44] [0.15, 0.44] [0.16, 0.45]
Inﬂation 0:11 0:12 0:14 0.14 0.14
[0.05, 0.21] [0.06, 0.23] [0.07, 0.24] [0.07, 0.24] [0.07, 0.25]
DSGE (medians)
(sum of 4 and 8 quarter ahead c-speciﬁc TFP news)
Consumption 0:13 0:07 0:20 0.29 0.37
Output 0:27 0:30 0:30 0.31 0.31
Hours 0:38 0:41 0:45 0.43 0.41
Investment 0:23 0:21 0:23 0.21 0.18
Bond Spread 0:07 0:25 0:40 0.41 0.43
Inﬂation 0:04 0:18 0:25 0.26 0.26
Sample is 1990Q2 to 2011Q1. The decomposition in the top panel is obtained from a six variable VAR featuring consumption
speciﬁc TFP, corporate bond spread, consumption, output, hours and inﬂation estimated with two lags, suggested by AIC and
SC lag length criteria.  News share for investment is obtained from a six variable VAR as above but where investment replaces
output. The decomposition in the middle panel is from identical VAR speciﬁcations (as in the top panel) run on 1,000 artiﬁcial
samples from the model.
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Figure 1: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. The solid line is the estimated impulse response to
an aggregate TFP news shock. The VAR includes, in this order, utilization–adjusted TFP,
(investment grade) corporate bond spread, consumption, output and hours worked with
4 lags as suggested by the AIC criterion. The TFP data is from Fernald (2012). The
rest of the data are described in detail in the Appendix. The identiﬁcation of the news
shock (based on the method of Barsky and Sims (2011) with the truncation horizon set to
H=40) and impulse responses presented in Figure 1 are very robust to changing the order of
the variables or choosing diﬀerent subsets of variables (including for example the Michigan
consumer conﬁdence indicator, inﬂation or S&P 500 index). The shaded gray areas are the
+/- one standard deviation conﬁdence band from 2000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications
of the reduced form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to forecast horizons (quarters) and the
units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations
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Figure 2: Dynamic correlations between key variables in the data (solid black line), implied
by the baseline model with all shocks (blue line with stars) and the model with the eight
quarter ahead consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock only (red line with circles).
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Figure 3: IRFs to a one std. deviation TFP news shock (anticipated 8 quarters ahead) in
the consumption sector. Median responses with 90% conﬁdence bands in shaded areas. The
horizontal axes refer to quarters and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations
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Figure 4: Responses to a one std. deviation TFP news shock (anticipated 8 quarters ahead)
in the consumption sector. Baseline model with ﬁnancial intermediation (black solid line),
and estimated model without ﬁnancial intermediation (red line with circles). The horizontal
axes refer to quarters and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations
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Figure 5: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. The solid line is the estimated impulse response to
a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock from a six variable VAR featuring consumption
speciﬁc TFP, (investment grade) corporate bond spread, consumption, output, hours and
inﬂation with 2 lags as suggested by the AIC criterion. The identiﬁcation of the news
shock is based on the method of Barsky and Sims (2011) with the truncation horizon set to
H=40. The shaded gray areas are the +/- one standard deviation conﬁdence band from 2000
bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to
forecast horizons (quarters) and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations
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Figure 6: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. The solid line is the estimated impulse response to
a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock from a six variable VAR featuring consumption
speciﬁc TFP, (investment grade) corporate bond spread, consumption, investment, hours
and inﬂation with 2 lags as suggested by the AIC criterion. The identiﬁcation of the news
shock is based on the method of Barsky and Sims (2011) with the truncation horizon set to
H=40. The shaded gray areas are the +/- one standard deviation conﬁdence band from 2000
bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to
forecast horizons (quarters) and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations
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Figure 7: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. The line with diamonds is the impulse response to a
2 year ahead consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock from the DSGE model. The thick solid
line is the impulse response to a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock from a six variable
VAR featuring TFP, (investment grade) corporate bond spread, consumption, output, hours
and inﬂation. The thin solid line (dotted lines) is the median (20%, 80% conﬁdence bands)
impulse response to a consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock estimated from a VAR (identical
to the empirical VAR, 6 variables, 2 lags and 84 observations) on 1,000 samples, generated
from the model. The horizontal axes refer to forecast horizons (quarters) and the units of
the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
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Figure 8: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. Share of variance in output and total hours accounted
for by consumption speciﬁc TFP news shocks in the VAR (light blue), the baseline DSGE
model with the ﬁnancial channel (red) and the baseline model without the ﬁnancial channel
(grey). The horizontal axis indicates the decomposition horizon in quarters. Median shares
are reported for the DSGE models, point estimate for the VAR.
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Figure 9: Sample is 1990Q2-2011Q1. The thick solid line is the impulse response to an
aggregate TFP news shock from a ﬁve variable VAR featuring TFP, (investment grade) cor-
porate bond spread, consumption, output, hours (identical to Figure 1). The thin solid line
(dotted lines) is the median (20%, 80% conﬁdence bands) impulse response to an aggregate
TFP news shock estimated from a VAR (identical to the empirical VAR, 5 variables, 4 lags
and 84 observations) on 1,000 samples, generated from the model. The horizontal axes refer
to forecast horizons (quarters) and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
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8 Appendix with supplementary material (Not for pub-
lication)
A Supporting details and results
A.1 Calibration and estimation
Calibration. Table 2 describes the calibrated parameters referred to in section 3. We
set the quarterly depreciation rate to be equal across sectors, C = I = 0:025. From
the steady state restriction  = C=R, we set  = 0:9974. The shares of capital in the
production functions, aC and aI , are assumed equal across sectors and ﬁxed at 0.3. The
steady state values for the ratios of nominal investment to consumption and government
spending to output are calibrated to be consistent with the average values in the data.
The steady state sectoral inﬂation rates are set to the sample averages and the sectoral
steady state mark-ups are assumed to be equal to 15%. We also calibrate the steady
state (deterministic) growth of TFP in the consumption/investment sectors in line with
the sample average growth rates of output in the two sectors. This yields ga = 0:141%
and gv = 0:434% per quarter. There are three parameters speciﬁc to ﬁnancial interme-
diation. The parameter B, which determines the banker’s average life span does not
have a direct empirical counterpart and is ﬁxed at 0:96, very similar to the value used
by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). This value implies an
average survival time of bankers of slightly over six years. The parameters $ and B
are ﬁxed at values which guarantee that the steady state risk premium (the average of
spreads across the two sectors) and the steady state leverage ratio matches their empir-
ical counterparts. The average of the consumption sector and investment sector credit
spreads are each equal to 50 basis points in the sample. The average leverage ratio in
the data is computed from the ratio of assets (excluding loans to consumers, real estate
and holdings of government bonds) to equity for all U.S. insured commercial banks and
is equal to 5.47. This value is considerably smaller compared to the ratio of total assets
to equity, which is equal to 11.52.
A.2 Full variance decomposition
Variance decomposition. Table 7 below reports the full decomposition results referred
to in section 4.
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A.3 Identiﬁcation tests
We perform two tests referred to in section 3. First, a test of (local) parameter identiﬁa-
bility as proposed by Iskrev (2010) the results of which suggest all parameters we estimate
are identiﬁable in a neighborhood of our estimates. This test evaluates the Jacobian of
the vector containing all parameters (including the parameters describing the exogenous
processes) which determine the ﬁrst two moments of the data. When evaluated at the
posterior mean of our parameter estimates this Jacobian matrix has full column rank—
equal to the number of parameters to be estimated. This implies that any chosen vector
of parameters around our estimates will give rise to an auto-covariance function that is
diﬀerent than that implied by our estimates. All estimations are done using DYNARE
(see Adjemian et al. (2011)), http://www.dynare.org. We calculate convergence diagnos-
tics in order to check and ensure the stability of the posterior distributions of parameters
as described in Brooks and Gelman (1998). Nevertheless because this test is a yes/no
proposition it cannot precisely scrutinize for weak identiﬁability. For this reason we adopt
an indicator of Bayesian learning proposed by Koop et al. (2012), namely the “Bayesian
learning rate indicator”, which given the focus on asymptotics gives an indication of the
informativeness of the data. This indicator examines the rate at which the posterior
precision of parameters gets updated with the sample size. For identiﬁed parameters the
posterior precision increases at rate T (with T denoting the sample size). The indicator
suggests no evidence of weak identiﬁcation: we measure this by taking the product of
posterior variances with T and examine if it converges to a constant for all parameters,
which we ﬁnd that it does, suggesting the posterior precision of parameters is updated at
the same rate as T. To implement this test we generate a large sample of simulated data
from the model equal to 30,000 observations. We then estimate the model on samples
of increasing size which we set to T = 50; 100; 1; 000; 10; 000; 20; 000; 25; 000; 30; 000, and
compute the posterior variance of parameters for these consecutive samples. Finally, we
check the rate at which these variances are declining in comparison to the sample size.
In the interest of space we do not report the results, but are available upon request.
A.4 Robustness checks
As explained in the main text, section 4, we undertake several robustness checks to assess
the sensitivity of our results, focusing on the importance of TFP news shocks. To this
end, we have estimated ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation removes ob-
servations from the most recent “Great recession” period (2008Q1 to 2011Q1) addressing
a potential concern that the volatility and disruption in ﬁnancial markets following the
Lehman collapse may be, at least partly, driving the important role of TFP news shocks
in ﬂuctuations, as well as potential misspeciﬁcation of the monetary policy rule when the
policy rate approaches the zero lower bound. The second speciﬁcation introduces smaller
prior means for the standard deviations for all TFP news shocks, assuming that the sum
of the variances of all TFP news components is only one third of the variance of the re-
spective unanticipated TFP component vs. one half assumed in the baseline. The third
speciﬁcation, assumes Gamma distributions for all shocks in the model, allowing for a
non-zero probability mass at zero for the standard deviations of news shocks. The fourth
speciﬁcation, introduces a common stationary aggregate TFP process with unanticipated
and news components. The last speciﬁcation, adds news components in all exogenous
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processes of the model (except monetary policy shock) including a common aggregate
TFP component, as in Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012).
The common TFP process is assumed to follow,
ft = (1  f )f + fft 1 + "ft ; with "ft = "ft;0 + "ft 4;4 + "ft 8;8:
Here, each component is assumed, N(0; 2f;t h), h = 0; 4; 8, uncorrelated across horizon
and time, and the parameter f 2 (0; 1) determines the persistence of the process. This
aggregate TFP shock is a natural candidate in generating broad based and sectoral co-
movement so it is interesting to check whether the importance of consumption sector TFP
news shocks in accounting for the variance in the data is robust in this speciﬁcation.
With the common aggregate TFP process the sectoral production functions become,
Ct(i) = max
n
Atft(LC;t(i))
1 ac(KC;t(i))ac   AtV
ac
1 ai
t FC ; 0
o
:
It(i) = max
n
Vtft(LI;t(i))
1 ai(KI;t(i))ai   V
1
1 ai
t FI ; 0
o
;
In the estimated speciﬁcation with the aggregate TFP shock, we indeed ﬁnd that an aggre-
gate TFP news shock induces qualitatively similar dynamics—and thus co-movement—to
a consumption sector TFP news shock with the notable exception of hours worked. While
hours worked rise on impact, they nevertheless decline signiﬁcantly at the time when the
positive aggregate TFP shock materializes.31 This is grossly at odds with the empirical
autocorrelations of hours worked in the data, which are strongly autocorrelated even at
very long lags (extending even at 10 lags, see Figure 2). A positive common TFP news
shock at the four quarter horizon would instead generate counterfactual negative autocor-
relations of hours worked at lags and leads beyond 1 and 2. Moreover, the variance shares
explained by the aggregate TFP news components are very small and never exceed ﬁve
percent in any observable. Including news components in non-structural disturbances
is motivated by evidence in Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012), who report, in estimated one sector models, news components in non-structural
disturbances, most notably, wage mark-ups, preference, marginal eﬃciency of investment
to dominate TFP news shocks, which are found to be very minor as sources of business
cycles. Therefore, it is also interesting scrutinizing whether our baseline result is robust
in this speciﬁcation. Table 8 suggests our ﬁnding about the importance of TFP news
shocks is robust across all of these diﬀerent experiments.
31The IRFs are not shown but are available upon request.
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A.5 Nominal rigidities
Co-movement and nominal rigidities. These frictions are important for the co-
movement properties of the consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock. Nominal (price and
wage) rigidities give rise to endogenous countercyclical price and wage mark ups. A
positive, consumption speciﬁc TFP news shock is associated with a fall in both sectoral
price mark ups (i.e. the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the real wage),
since ﬁrms cannot fully adjust prices to higher demand, shifting sectoral labor demand
to the right. At the same time, the same shock is associated with a fall in the wage
mark up (i.e. the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage)
causing a rightward shift of the labor supply. Both of these forces, act to counteract and
dominate the negative wealth eﬀect on labor supply due to the expected improvement
in productivity and equilibrium hours rise. The properties of the model where nominal
rigidities are minimized, are shown in Figure 10.32 The speciﬁcation where nominal (price
and wage) rigidities are (nearly) eliminated has a noticeable eﬀect on the propagation of
the news shock. First, co-movement does not obtain: Consumption now declines, caused
by a decline in hours worked employed in that sector, suggesting that the behavior of
mark-ups is important for sectoral hours comovement, consistent with the analysis in
DiCecio (2009). Second, the impact of countercyclical price mark-ups, compared to
countercyclical wage mark-ups, is far more important for co-movement (see IRFs in circled
lines). We can observe that the elimination of wage rigidities does not change the response
of consumption and hours worked in the consumption sector qualitatively—they both
continue to increase, though less strongly, compared to the baseline. This demonstrates
that, countercyclical price mark-ups alone, with the shift in labor demand they generate,
work to counteract the negative wealth eﬀect on labor supply.33
A.6 Investment Speciﬁc Shocks and the relative price of invest-
ment
We derive the expression for the relative price of investment (RPI) and use it to show
that in our two sector model, RPI cannot alone identify investment speciﬁc shocks, an
assumption built in the majority of one sector models.
32The Figure plots a set of IRFs where both price and wage rigidities are nearly eliminated and a set
of IRFs where only wage rigidities are nearly eliminated. The ﬁrst set is generated from the baseline
model where we have set the steady state mark-ups, namely, p = w = 0:01, indexation parameters,
pC = pI = w = 0:01, and Calvo probabilities for prices and wages, C = I = w = 0:01. The second
set is generated from the baseline model where we have set the steady state wage mark-up, namely,
w = 0:01, indexation parameter, w = 0:01, and calvo probability for wages, w = 0:01.
33We have also examined the sensitivity to variations in real rigidity parameters. Speciﬁcally, invest-
ment adjustment cost (IAC), habit persistence, utilization elasticity parameters, with all other param-
eters set to their estimated values. An interesting ﬁnding, is that, qualitatively, these parameters do
not matter for the co-movement properties of consumption sector TFP news, though of course matter
quantitatively. Under all parametrizations we examine, the consumption sector TFP news shock is ex-
pansionary. We do not show the IRFs for all diﬀerent perturbations here in the interest of space, but
they are available upon request.
44
10 20 30 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Output
10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Consumption
10 20 30 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real Wage
10 20 30 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Rel. Price of Investment
10 20 30 40
−15
−10
−5
0
x 10−3Wage Markup
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Total Investment
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
C−Sector Investment
10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
I−Sector Investment
10 20 30 40
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
C−Sector Price of Capital
10 20 30 40
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
C−Sector Price Markup
10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Total Hours
10 20 30 40
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
C−Sector Hours
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
I−Sector Hours
10 20 30 40
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I−Sector Price of Capital
10 20 30 40
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
I−Sector Price Markup
Figure 10: Responses to a one std. deviation TFP news shock (anticipated 8 quarters
ahead) in the consumption sector. Baseline model (black solid line) vs. model without
wage and price rigidities (blue dashed line) vs. model without wage rigidities (red line with
circles) The horizontal axes refer to quarters and the units of the vertical axes are percentage
deviations.
PI;t
PC;t
=
mark upI;t
mark upC;t
1  ac
1  ai
At
Vt
KI;t
LI;t
 aiKC;t
LC;t
ac
where, ac; ai are capital shares in consumption, and investment sector respectively.
Vt; At, is TFP in the investment and consumption sector respectively, and
Kx;t
Lx;t
; x = I; C
the capital-labor ratio in sector x. mark upx;t is the price mark-up or inverse of the
real marginal cost in sector x. Vt corresponds to the investment speciﬁc shock. Notice
how the relative price of investment can be driven—at least in the short run—by, (a)
mark up shocks, via their impact on the sectoral price-cost mark ups, (b) sector speciﬁc
TFP and, (c) diﬀerences in capital labor ratios across sectors (due to the sector speciﬁc
nature of capital in the model). The fact that (c) above aﬀects the relative price of
investment implies that all shocks can in principle aﬀect this price. In a special case
of our model with: (i) perfectly competitive product markets, (ii) identical production
functions (factor intensities) in both sectors and (iii) full factor mobility, the expression
above simpliﬁes to, PI;t
PC;t
= At
Vt
.34 In this case the model admits a one sector representation
(e.g. Greenwood et al. (2000)). Further, one can readily redeﬁne the investment sector
TFP process as Vt = AtV t , where in this formulation At denotes sector neutral TFP, while
34A slightly diﬀerent and simpler formulation of a two sector model, where investment producers buy
ﬁnal goods and convert them to investment would eﬀectively deliver this restriction (see Justiniano et al.
(2011)). This is the approach followed by most one sector New Keynesian models.
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V t denotes investment speciﬁc TFP. Under this equivalent formulation the expression
above becomes, PI;t
PC;t
= (V t )
 1, a commonly used restriction in one sector estimated
DSGE models. Thus, under assumptions (i)-(iii), one can identify the investment speciﬁc
technology shock from the relative price of investment alone. But as demonstrated,
this tight restriction, is not necessarily valid in a more elaborate two sector model with
an imperfectly competitive investment sector and slow capital mobility across sectors,
like ours. In the more general framework we consider, variation in the relative price of
investment reﬂects not only investment speciﬁc shocks but also (in principle) other shocks.
This is illustrated in Table 7 where investment sector TFP shocks explain around 60%
of the variation in the relative price. The remaining 40% is accounted for by, mainly,
consumption sector TFP and price mark up shocks.
The variance shares accounted for by investment sector TFP shocks we estimate are
smaller compared to, for example, Justiniano et al. (2010). Note however, that in the
latter study—in addition to a diﬀerent sample period—the concept of investment shocks
is broader, in that they can include both investment sector TFP as well as, for example,
ﬁnancial shocks aﬀecting the transformation of investment to capital. An advantage of
our two sector model is that we can explore a ﬁner decomposition between investment
speciﬁc shocks and ﬁnancial type shocks. In the estimation, we allow for capital quality
shocks, which directly aﬀect the sectoral capital accumulation equation (see equation
(4)).35 A positive shock of this type has the property that it raises the price of capital
and thus causes a revaluation of assets in the banks’ portfolios, leading to gains in bank
equity and expansion in lending allowing an interpretation as a ﬁnancial shock. Table 7
suggests the role of the capital quality shocks is fairly limited, accounting for less than
10% in the majority of macroeconomic real and nominal series (except consumption), but
nevertheless account for shares close to 20% in two out of the three ﬁnancial observables,
consistent with the interpretation we adopt for these shocks.
B Data Sources and Time Series Construction
Table 9 provides an overview of the data used to construct the observables. All the data
transformations we have made in order to construct the dataset used for the estimation of
the model are described in detail below. Unless otherwise noted, the same variables are
used for estimating the various VAR speciﬁcations. The data series for aggregate and con-
sumption speciﬁc TFP used to estimate the VARs are taken from John Fernald’s website
(http : ==www:frbsf:org=economic  research=economists=jfernald=quarterlytfp:xls),
and are described in Fernald (2012).
Sectoral deﬁnition. To allocate a sector to the consumption or investment cate-
gory, we used the 2005 Input-Output tables. The Input-Output tables track the ﬂows of
goods and services across industries and record the ﬁnal use of each industry’s output
into three broad categories: consumption, investment and intermediate uses (as well as
net exports and government). First, we determine how much of a 2-digit industry’s ﬁnal
output goes to consumption as opposed to investment or intermediate uses. Then we
adopt the following criterion: if the majority of an industry’s ﬁnal output is allocated
35These shocks have been recently considered by Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and Gourio (2012) in calibrated one sector models.
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to ﬁnal consumption demand it is classiﬁed as a consumption sector; otherwise, if the
majority of an industry’s output is allocated to investment or intermediate demand, it is
classiﬁed as an investment sector. Using this criterion, mining, utilities, transportation
and warehousing, information, manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade indus-
tries are classiﬁed as the investment sector and retail trade, ﬁnance, insurance, real estate,
rental and leasing, professional and business services, educational services, health care
and social assistance, arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services
and other services except government are classiﬁed as the consumption sector.36
Real and nominal variables. Consumption (in current prices) is deﬁned as the
sum of personal consumption expenditures on services and personal consumption expen-
ditures on non-durable goods. The times series for real consumption is constructed as
follows. First, we compute the shares of services and non-durable goods in total (current
price) consumption. Then, total real consumption growth is obtained as the chained
weighted (using the nominal shares above) growth rate of real services and growth rate
of real non-durable goods. Using the growth rate of real consumption we construct a
series for real consumption using 2005 as the base year. The consumption deﬂator is cal-
culated as the ratio of nominal over real consumption. Inﬂation of consumer prices is the
growth rate of the consumption deﬂator. Analogously, we construct a time series for the
investment deﬂator using series for (current price) personal consumption expenditures on
durable goods and gross private domestic investment and chain weight to arrive at the
real aggregate. The relative price of investment is the ratio of the investment deﬂator
and the consumption deﬂator. Real output is GDP expressed in consumption units by
dividing current price GDP with the consumption deﬂator.
The hourly wage is deﬁned as total compensation per hour. Dividing this series by
the consumption deﬂator yields the real wage rate. Hours worked is given by hours of all
persons in the non-farm business sector. All series described above as well as the equity
capital series (described below) are expressed in per capita terms using the series of non-
institutional population, ages 16 and over. The nominal interest rate is the eﬀective
federal funds rate. We use the monthly average per quarter of this series and divide it by
four to account for the quarterly frequency of the model. The time series for hours is in
logs. Moreover, all series used in estimation (including the ﬁnancial time series described
below) are expressed in deviations from their sample average.
Financial variables. Data for sectoral credit spreads are not directly available. How-
ever, Reuters’ Datastream provides U.S. credit spreads for companies which we map into
the two sectors using The North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).37 A
credit spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a company’s corporate bond yield and
36We have checked whether there is any migration of 2-digit industries across sectors for our sample.
The only industry which changes classiﬁcation (from consumption to investment) during the sample is
“information” which for the majority of the sample can be classiﬁed as investment and we classify it as
such.
37We use the 2005 NAICS codes. The investment sector is deﬁned to consist of companies in mining,
utilities, transportation and warehousing, information, manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade
industries (NAICS codes 21 22 23 31 32 33 42 48 49 51 (except 491)). The consumption sector consists
of companies in retail trade, ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, professional and business
services, educational services, health care and social assistance,arts, entertainment, recreation, accom-
modation and food services and other services except government (NAICS codes 6 7 11 44 45 52 53 54
55 56 81).
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Table 9: Time Series used to construct the observables and steady state relationships
Time Series Description Units Code Source
Gross domestic product CP, SA, billion $ GDP BEA
Gross Private Domestic Investment CP, SA, billion $ GPDI BEA
Real Gross Private Domestic Investment CVM, SA, billion $ GPDIC1 BEA
Personal Consumption Exp.: Durable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCDG BEA
Real Personal Consumption Exp.: Durable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCDGCC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CP, SA, billion $ PCESV BEA
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services CVM, SA, billion $ PCESVC96 BEA
Personal Consumption Exp.: Nondurable Goods CP, SA, billion $ PCND BEA
Real Personal Consumption Exp.: Nondurable Goods CVM, SA, billion $ PCNDGC96 BEA
Civilian Noninstitutional Population NSA, 1000s CNP160V BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour SA, Index 2005=100 COMPNFB BLS
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons SA, Index 2005=100 HOANBS BLS
Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate NSA, percent FEDFUNDS BG
Total Equity NSA EQTA IEC
Total Assets NSA H.8 FRB
All Employees SA B-1 BLS
Average Weekly Hours SA B-7 BLS
CP = current prices, CVM = chained volume measures (2005 Dollars), SA = seasonally adjusted, NSA = not seasonally
adjusted. BEA = U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BLS = U.S. Department of Labor:
Bureau of Labor Statistics and BG = Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, IEC = Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, FRB = Federal Reserve Board.
the yield of a US Treasury bond with an identical maturity. In constructing credit spreads
we only consider non-ﬁnancial corporations and only bonds traded in the secondary mar-
ket. In line with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) we make the following adjustments to
the credit spread data we construct: using ratings from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s,
we exclude all bonds which are below investment grade as well as the bonds for which
ratings are unavailable. We further exclude all spreads with a duration below one and
above 30 years and exclude all credit spreads below 10 and above 5000 basis points to
ensure that the time series are not driven by a small number of extreme observations.
The series for the sectoral credit spreads are constructed by taking the average over all
company level spreads available in a certain quarter. These two series are transformed
from basis points into percent and divided by four to guarantee that they are consistent
with the quarterly frequency of our model. After these adjustments the dataset (1990Q2-
2011Q1) contains 5381 bonds of which 1213 are classiﬁed to be issued by companies in
the consumption sector and 4168 issued by companies in the investment sector. This
is equivalent to 35413 observations in the consumption and 115286 observations in the
investment sector over the entire sample. The average duration is 30 quarters (consump-
tion sector) and 28 quarters (investment sector) with an average rating for both sectoral
bond issues between BBB+ and A-. The total number of ﬁrms in our sample is equal
to 1696, where 516 ﬁrms belong to the consumption sector and 1180 ﬁrms belong to the
investment sector. The correlation between the two sectoral spread series is equal to 0.83.
Steady state ﬁnancial parameters. The steady state leverage ratio of ﬁnancial
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intermediaries in the model – which helps to pin down the parameters $ and B – is
calculated by taking the sample average of the inverse of total equity over adjusted assets
of all insured US commercial banks available from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council. The same body reports a series of equity over total assets. We
multiply this ratio with total assets in order to get total equity for the U.S. banking
sector that we use in estimation. Total assets includes consumer loans and holdings of
government bonds which we want to exclude from total assets to be consistent with the
model concept. Thus, to arrive at an estimate for adjusted assets we subtract consumer,
real estate loans and holdings of government and government guaranteed bonds (such
as government sponsored institutions) from total assets of all insured U.S. commercial
banks.
C Model Details and Derivations
We provide the model details and derivations required for solution and estimation of
the model. We begin with the pricing and wage decisions of ﬁrms and households, the
ﬁnancial sector followed by the normalization of the model to render it stationary, the
description of the steady state and the log-linearized model equations.
C.1 Intermediate and Final Goods Producers
Intermediate producers pricing decision. A constant fraction p;x of intermediate
ﬁrms in sector x = C; I cannot choose their price optimally in period t but reset their
price — as in Calvo (1983) — according to the indexation rule,
PC;t(i) = PC;t 1(i)
pC
C;t 1
1 pC
C ;
PI;t(i) = PI;t 1(i)
pI
I;t 1
1 pI
I
h At
At 1
 1 Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai
ipI
;
where C;t  PC;tPC;t 1 and I;t 
PI;t
PI;t 1

At
At 1
 1
Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai is gross inﬂation in the two
sectors and C , I denote steady state values. The factor that appears in the investment
sector expression adjusts for investment speciﬁc progress.
The remaining fraction of ﬁrms, (1  p;x), in sector x = C; I can adjust the price in
period t. These ﬁrms choose their price optimally by maximizing the present discounted
value of future proﬁts.
The resulting aggregate price index in the consumption sector is,
PC;t =

(1  p;C) ~P
1
Cp;t
C;t + p;C
C;t 1

pC

1 pC
C PC;t 1
 1
Cp;t
Cp;t
:
The aggregate price index in the investment sector is,
PI;t =

(1  p;I) ~P
1
Ip;t
I;t + p;I

PI;t 1
I;t 1

pI

1 pI
I
h At
At 1
 1 Vt
Vt 1
 1 ac
1 ai
ipI 1Ip;t Ip;t :
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Final goods producers. Proﬁt maximization and the zero proﬁt condition for ﬁnal
good ﬁrms imply that sectoral prices of the ﬁnal goods, PC;t and PI;t, are CES aggregates
of the prices of intermediate goods in the respective sector, PC;t(i) and PI;t(i),
PC;t =
"Z 1
0
PC;t(i)
1
Cp;t di
#Cp;t
; PI;t =
"Z 1
0
PI;t(i)
1
Ip;t di
#Ip;t
:
The elasticity xp;t is the time varying price markup over marginal cost for intermediate
ﬁrms. It is assumed to follow the exogenous stochastic process,
log(1 + xp;t) = (1  xp) log(1 + xp) + xp log(1 + xp;t 1) + "xp;t;
where xp 2 (0; 1) and "xp;t is i:i:d: N(0; 2xp), with x = C; I.
C.1.1 Household’s wage setting
Each household j 2 [0; 1] supplies specialized labor, Lt(j), monopolistically as in Erceg et al.
(2000). A large number of competitive “employment agencies” aggregate this specialized
labor into a homogenous labor input which is sold to intermediate goods producers in a
competitive market. Aggregation is done according to the following function,
Lt =
"Z 1
0
Lt(j)
1
1+w;t dj
#1+w;t
:
The desired markup of wages over the household’s marginal rate of substitution (or wage
mark-up), w;t, follows the exogenous stochastic process,
log(1 + w;t) = (1  w) log(1 + w) + w log(1 + w;t 1) + "w;t;
where w 2 (0; 1) and "w;t is i:i:d: N(0; 2w).
Proﬁt maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agencies implies the
labor demand function,
Lt(j) =
Wt(j)
Wt
  1+w;t
w;t Lt; (C.1)
where Wt(j) is the wage received from employment agencies by the supplier of labor of
type j, while the wage paid by intermediate ﬁrms for the homogenous labor input is,
Wt =
"Z 1
0
Wt(j)
1
w;t dj
#w;t
:
Following Erceg et al. (2000), in each period, a fraction w of the households cannot
freely adjust its wage but follows the indexation rule,
Wt+1(j) = Wt(j)

c;te
zt+
ac
1 ai vt
w
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
1 w
:
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The remaining fraction of households, (1   w), chooses an optimal wage, Wt(j), by
maximizing,38
Et
( 1X
s=0
sw
s
"
  bt+s'Lt+s(j)
1+
1 + 
+ t+sWt(j)Lt+s(j)
#)
;
subject to the labor demand function (C.1). The aggregate wage evolves according to,
Wt =
(
(1  w)( ~Wt)
1
w + w
h
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
1 w
c;t 1e
zt 1+ ac1 ai vt 1
w
Wt 1
i 1
w
)w
;
where ~Wt is the optimally chosen wage.
C.2 Physical capital producers
Capital producers in sector x = C; I use a fraction of investment goods from ﬁnal goods
producers and undepreciated capital stock from capital services producers (as described
above) to produce new capital goods, subject to investment adjustment costs as proposed
by Christiano et al. (2005). These new capital goods are then sold in perfectly competitive
capital goods markets to capital services producers. The technology available for physical
capital production is given as,
O0x;t = Ox;t +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t;
where Ox;t denotes the amount of used capital at the end of period t, O0x;t the new
capital available for use at the beginning of period t+1. The investment adjustment cost
function S() satisﬁes the following: S(1) = S 0(1) = 0 and S 00(1) =  > 0, where "0"s
denote diﬀerentiation. The optimization problem of capital producers in sector x = C; I
is given as,
max
Ix;t;Ox;t
Et
1X
t=0
tt

Qx;t

Ox;t +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t

 Qx;tOx;t   PI;t
PC;t
Ix;t

;
where Qx;t denotes the price of capital (i.e. the value of installed capital in consumption
units). The ﬁrst order condition for investment goods is,
PI;t
PC;t
=Qx;t
"
1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

  S 0
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1
#
+ EtQx;t+1
t+1
t
"
S 0
Ix;t+1
Ix;t
Ix;t+1
Ix;t
2#
:
From the capital producer’s problem it is evident that any value of Ox;t is proﬁt max-
imizing. Let x 2 (0; 1) denote the depreciation rate of capital and Kx;t 1 the cap-
38All households that can reoptimize will choose the same wage. The probability to be able to
adjust the wage, (1   w), can be seen as a reduced-form representation of wage rigidities with a
broader microfoundation; for example quadratic adjustment costs (Calvo (1983)), information frictions
(Mankiw, N. Gregory and Reis, Ricardo (2002)) and contract costs (Caplin and Leahy (1997)).
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ital stock available at the beginning of period t in sector x = C; I. Then setting
Ox;t = (1   )Kx;t Kx;t 1 implies the available (sector speciﬁc) capital stock in sector
x, evolves according to,
Kx;t = (1  x)Kx;t Kx;t 1 +

1  S
 Ix;t
Ix;t 1

Ix;t; x = C; I; (C.2)
as described in the main text.
C.3 Financial Intermediaries
This section describes in detail how the setup of Gertler and Karadi (2011) is adapted for
the two sector model and describes in detail how the equations for ﬁnancial intermediaries
in the main text are derived.
The balance sheet for the consumption or investment sector branch can be expressed
as,
PC;tQx;tSx;t = PC;tNx;t +Bx;t; x = C; I;
where Sx;t denotes the quantity of ﬁnancial claims held by the intermediary branch and
Qx;t denotes the sector speciﬁc price of a claim. The variable Nx;t represents the bank’s
wealth (or equity) at the end of period t and Bx;t are the deposits the intermediary branch
obtains from households. The sector speciﬁc assets held by the ﬁnancial intermediary
pay the stochastic return RBx;t+1 in the next period. Intermediaries pay at t+ 1 the non-
contingent real gross return Rt to households for their deposits made at time t. Then,
the intermediary branch equity evolves over time as,
Nx;t+1PC;t+1 = R
B
x;t+1C;t+1PC;tQx;tSx;t  RtBx;t
Nx;t+1
PC;t+1
PC;t
= RBx;t+1C;t+1Qx;tSx;t  Rt(Qx;tSx;t  Nx;t)
Nx;t+1 =

(RBx;t+1C;t+1  Rt)Qx;tSx;t +RtNx;t
 1
C;t+1
:
The premium, RBx;t+1C;t+1   Rt, as well as the quantity of assets, Qx;tSx;t, determines
the growth in bank’s equity above the riskless return. The bank will not fund any assets
with a negative discounted premium. It follows that for the bank to operate in period i
the following inequality must hold,
Et
iBt+1+i(R
B
x;t+1+iC;t+1+i  Rt+i)  0; i  0;
where iBt+1+i is the bank’s stochastic discount factor, with,
Bt+1 
t+1
t
;
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget equation. Under perfect
capital markets, arbitrage guarantees that the risk premium collapses to zero and the
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relation always holds with equality. However, under imperfect capital markets, credit
constraints rooted in the bank’s inability to obtain enough funds may lead to positive
risk premia. As long as the above inequality holds, banks will keep building assets
by borrowing additional funds from households. Accordingly, the intermediary branch
objective is to maximize expected terminal wealth,
Vx;t =maxEt
X
i=0
(1  B)iBiBt+1+iNx;t+1+i
=maxEt
X
i=0
(1  B)iBiBt+1+i[(RBx;t+1+iC;t+1+i  Rt+i)
Qx;t+iSx;t+i
C;t+1+i
+
Rt+iNx;t+i
C;t+1+i
];
(C.3)
where B 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of bankers at t that survive until period t+ 1.
Following the setup in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) the
banks are limited from inﬁnitely borrowing additional funds from households by a moral
hazard/costly enforcement problem. On the one hand, the agent who works in the bank
can choose, at the beginning of each period, to divert the fraction B of available funds
and transfer it back to the household. On the other hand, depositors can force the bank
into bankruptcy and recover a fraction 1 B of assets. Note that the fraction, B, which
intermediaries can divert is the same across sectors to guarantee that the household is
indiﬀerent between lending funds between diﬀerent branches.
Given this tradeoﬀ, depositors will only lend funds to the intermediary when the
latter’s maximized expected terminal wealth is larger or equal to the gain from diverting
the fraction B of available funds. This incentive constraint can be formalized as,
Vx;t  BQx;tSx;t; 0 < B < 1: (C.4)
Using equation (C.3), the expression for Vx;t can be written as the following ﬁrst-order
diﬀerence equation,
Vx;t = x;tQx;tSx;t + x;tNx;t;
with,
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1(RBx;t+1C;t+1  Rt) + BZx1;t+1x;t+1g;
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1Rt + BZx2;t+1x;t+1g;
and,
Zx1;t+1+i 
Qx;t+1+iSx;t+1+i
Qx;t+iSx;t+i
; Zx2;t+1+i 
Nx;t+1+i
Nx;t+i
:
The variable x;t can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain of ex-
panding assets Qx;tSx;t by one unit while holding wealth Nx;t constant. The interpretation
of x;t is analogous: it is the expected discounted value of having an additional unit of
wealth, Nx;t, holding the quantity of ﬁnancial claims, Sx;t, constant. The gross growth
rate in assets is denoted by Zx1;t+i and the gross growth rate of net worth is denoted by
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Zx2;t+i.
Then, using the expression for Vx;t, we can express the intermediary’s incentive con-
straint (C.4) as,
x;tQx;tSx;t + x;tNx;t  BQx;tSx;t:
As indicated above, under perfect capital markets banks will expand borrowing until the
risk premium collapses to zero which implies that in this case x;t equals zero as well.
Imperfect capital markets however, limit the possibilities for this kind of arbitrage because
the intermediaries are constrained by their equity capital. If the incentive constraint binds
it follows that,
Qx;tSx;t =
x;t
B   x;tNx;t
= %x;tNx;t: (C.5)
In this case, the quantity of assets which the intermediary can acquire depends on the
equity capital, Nx;t, as well as the intermediary’s leverage ratio, %x;t, limiting the bank’s
ability to acquire assets. This leverage ratio is the ratio of the bank’s intermediated
assets to equity. The bank’s leverage ratio is limited to the point where its maximized
expected terminal wealth equals the gains from diverting the fraction B from available
funds. However, the constraint (C.5) binds only if 0 < x;t < B (given Nx;t > 0). This
inequality is always satisﬁed with our estimates.
Using the leverage ratio (C.5) we can express the evolution of the intermediary’s
wealth as,
Nx;t+1 = [(R
B
x;t+1C;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt]
Nx;t
C;t+1
:
From this equation it also follows that,
Zx2;t+1 =
Nx;t+1
Nx;t
=

(RBx;t+1C;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt
 1
C;t+1
;
and,
Zx1;t+1 =
Qx;t+1Sx;t+1
Qx;tSx;t
=
%x;t+1Nx;t+1
%x;tNx;t
=
%x;t+1
%x;t
Zx2;t+1:
Financial intermediaries which are forced into bankruptcy are replaced by new en-
trants. Therefore, total wealth of ﬁnancial intermediaries is the sum of the net worth of
existing, N ex;t, and new ones, Nnx;t,
Nx;t = N
e
x;t +N
n
x;t:
The fraction B of bankers at t  1 which survive until t is equal across branches. Then,
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the law of motion for existing bankers is given by,
N ex;t =B[(R
B
x;tC;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]
Nx;t 1
C;t
; 0 < B < 1: (C.6)
where a main source of variation is the ex-post excess return on assets, RBx;tC;t  Rt 1.
New banks receive startup funds from their respective household, equal to a small
fraction of the value of assets held by the existing bankers in their ﬁnal operating period.
Given that the exit probability is i:i:d:, the value of assets held by the existing bankers in
their ﬁnal operating period is given by (1 B)Qx;tSx;t. The transfer to new intermediaries
is a fraction, $, of this value, leading to the following formulation for new banker’s wealth,
Nnx;t = $Qx;tSx;t; 0 < $ < 1: (C.7)
Existing banker’s net worth (C.6) and entering banker’s net worth (C.7) lead to the law
of motion for total net worth,
Nx;t =
 
B[(R
B
x;tC;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]
Nx;t 1
C;t
+$Qx;tSx;t

:
The excess return, x = C; I can be deﬁned as,
RSx;t = R
B
x;t+1C;t+1  Rt:
Since Rt, B, $ and B are equal across sectors, the institutional setup of the two
representative banks in the two sectors is symmetric. Both branches hold deposits from
households and buy assets from ﬁrms in the sector they provide specialized lending. Their
performance diﬀers because the demand for capital diﬀers across sectors resulting in sector
speciﬁc prices of capital, Qx;t, and nominal rental rates for capital, RKx;t. Note that the
institutional setup of banks does not depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. Gertler and Karadi
(2011) show that this implies a setup with a continuum of banks is equivalent to a
formulation with a representative bank. Owing to the symmetry of the banks this also
holds for our formulation of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the two-sector setup.
C.4 Resource Constraints
The resource constraint in the consumption sector is,
Ct + (a(uC;t)
K
C;t
KC;t 1 + a(uI;t)KI;t KI;t 1)
AtV
ac
1 ai
t
V
1
1 ai
t
= AtL
1 ac
c;t K
ac
c;t   AtV
ac
1 ai
t FC :
The resource constraint in the investment sector is,
II;t + IC;t = VtL
1 ai
I;t K
ai
I;t   V
1
1 ai
t FI :
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Hours worked are aggregated as,
Lt = LI;t + LC;t:
C.5 Stationary Economy
The model includes two non-stationary TFP shocks, At and Vt. This section shows how
we normalize the model to render it stationary. Lower case variables denote normalized
stationary variables.
The model variables can be stationarized as follows:
kx;t =
Kx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; kx;t =
Kx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; kt =
Kt
V
1
1 ai
t
; (C.8)
ix;t =
Ix;t
V
1
1 ai
t
; it =
It
V
1
1 ai
t
; ct =
Ct
AtV
ac
1 ai
t
; (C.9)
rKC;t =
RKC;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t ; r
K
I;t =
RKI;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t ; wt =
Wt
PC;tAtV
ac
1 ai
t
: (C.10)
From
PI;t
PC;t
=
mcC;t
mcI;t
1  ac
1  ai
At
Vt
KI;t
LI;t
 aiKC;t
LC;t
ac
=
mcC;t
mcI;t
1  ac
1  aiAtV
ac 1
1 ai
t
 kI;t
LI;t
 ai kC;t
LC;t
ac
;
follows that,
pi;t =
PI;t
PC;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t : (C.11)
and the multipliers are normalized as,
t = tAtV
ac
1 ai
t ; x;t = x;tV
1
1 ai
t : (C.12)
where x;t denotes the multiplier on the respective capital accumulation equation. Using
the growth of investment, it follows that the prices of capital can be normalized as,
qx;t = Qx;tA
 1
t V
1 ac
1 ai
t :
with the price of capital in sector x, deﬁned as,
qx;t = x;t=t; x = C; I:
56
Using the growth of capital, it follows,
sx;t =
Sx;t
V
1
1 ai
t
:
Then, it follows from entering bankers wealth equation (C.7) that,
nnx;t = N
n
x;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t :
Total wealth, wealth of existing and entering bankers has to grow at the same rate,
nex;t = N
e
x;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t ; nx;t = Nx;tA
 1
t V
 ac
1 ai
t :
C.5.1 Intermediate goods producers
Firm’s production function in the consumption sector:
ct = L
1 ac
C;t k
ac
C;t   FC : (C.13)
Firm’s production function in the investment sector:
it = L
1 ai
I;t k
ai
I;t   FI : (C.14)
Marginal costs in the consumption sector:
mcC;t = (1  ac)ac 1a acc (rKC;t)acw1 act : (C.15)
Marginal costs in the investment sector:
mcI;t = (1  ai)ai 1a aii w1 ait (rKI;t)aip 1i;t ; with pi;t =
PI;t
PC;t
: (C.16)
Capital labour ratios in the two sectors:
kC;t
LC;t
=
wt
rKC;t
ac
1  ac ;
kI;t
LI;t
=
wt
rKI;t
ai
1  ai : (C.17)
C.5.2 Firms’ pricing decisions
Price setting equation for ﬁrms that change their price in sector x = C; I:
0 = Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
st+s~xt+s
h
~px;t ~t;t+s   (1 + xp;t+s)mcx;t+s
i)
; (C.18)
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with
~t;t+s =
sY
k=1
"x;t+k 1
x
pxx;t+k
x
 1#
and ~xt+s =
 ~Px;t
Px;t
~t;t+s
  1+xp;t+s
xp;t+s xt+s
and
~Px;t
Px;t
= ~px;t:
Aggregate price index in the consumption sector:
1 =
"
(1  x;p)(~px;t)
1
xp;t + x;p
hx;t 1
x
pxx;t
x
 1i 1
xp;t
#xp;t
:
It further holds that
I;t
C;t
=
pi;t
pi;t 1
: (C.19)
C.5.3 Household’s optimality conditions and wage setting
Marginal utility of income:
t =
bt
ct   hct 1

At 1
At

Vt 1
Vt
 ac
1 ai
  h bt+1
ct+1

At+1
At

Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai   hct
: (C.20)
Euler equation:
t = Ett+1
 At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 aiRt
1
c;t+1
:
Labor supply
twt = bt'(LC;t + LI;t)
 ;
C.5.4 Capital services
Optimal capital utilization:
rKC;t = a
0
C(uC;t); r
K
I;t = a
0
I(uI;t):
Deﬁnition of capital services:
kC;t = uC;t
K
C;t
kC;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai ; kI;t = uI;t
K
I;t
kI;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai : (C.21)
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Optimal choice of available capital in sector x = C; I:
x;t = Et
K
x;t+1
(
t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai (rKx;t+1ux;t+1   a(ux;t+1)) + (1  )Etx;t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai
)
;
(C.22)
C.5.5 Physical capital producers
Optimal choice of investment in sector x = C; I:
tpi;t =x;t
"
1  S
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai

  S 0
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai
#
+ Etx;t+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 1
1 ai
"
S 0
ix;t+1
ix;t
Vt+1
Vt
 1
1 ai
ix;t+1
ix;t
Vt+1
Vt
 1
1 ai
2#
: (C.23)
Accumulation of capital in sector x = C; I:
kx;t = (1  x)Kx;tkx;t 1
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai +

1  S
 ix;t
ix;t 1
 Vt
Vt 1
 1
1 ai

ix;t; (C.24)
C.5.6 Household’s wage setting
Household’s wage setting:
Et
1X
s=0
sswt+s
~Lt+s
"
~wt ~
w
t;t+s   (1 + w;t+s)bt+s'
~Lt+s
t+s
#
= 0; (C.25)
with
~wt;t+s =
sY
k=1
" 
C;t+k 1e
at+k 1+ ac1 ai vt+k 1
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
!w 
C;t+ke
at+k+
ac
1 ai vt+k
Ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
! 1#
and
~Lt+s =
 ~wt ~wt;t+s
wt+s
  1+w;t+s
w;t+s Lt+s:
Wages evolve according to
wt =
(
(1  w) ~w
1
w;t
t + w
"c;t 1eat 1+ ac1 ai vt 1
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
lwc;teat+ ac1 ai vt
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
 1
wt 1
# 1
w;t
)w;t
:
C.5.7 Financial Intermediation
The stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed as,
Bt+1 =
t+1
t
:
59
Then, one can derive expressions for x;t and x;t,
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1
At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 ai (RBx;t+1C;t+1  Rt) + Bzx1;t+1x;t+1g;
x;t = Etf(1  B)Bt+1
At
At+1
 Vt
Vt+1
 ac
1 aiRt + Bz
x
2;t+1x;t+1g;
with
zx1;t+1+i 
qx;t+1+isx;t+1+i
qx;t+isx;t+i
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai ; zx2;t+1+i 
nx;t+1+i
nx;t+i
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai :
It follows that if the bank’s incentive constraint binds it can be expressed as,
x;tqx;tsx;t + x;tnx;t = Bqx;tsx;t
,qx;tsx;t = %x;tnx;t;
with the leverage ratio given as,
%x;t =
x;t
B   x;t :
It further follows that:
zx2;t+1 =
nx;t+1
nx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai =

(RBx;t+1C;t+1  Rt)%x;t +Rt
 1
C;t+1
;
and
zx1;t+1 =
qx;t+1sx;t+1
qx;tsx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai =
%x;t+1nx;t+1
%x;tnx;t
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
 ac
1 ai =
%x;t+1
%x;t
zx2;t+1:
The normalized equation for bank’s wealth accumulation is,
nx;t =
 
B[(R
B
x;tC;t  Rt 1)%x;t 1 +Rt 1]
At 1
At
Vt 1
Vt
 ac
1 ai nx;t 1
C;t
+$qx;tsx;t

:
The borrow in advance constraint:
kx;t+1 = sx;t:
The leverage equation:
qx;tsx;t = %x;tnx;t:
Bank’s stochastic return on assets can be described in normalized variables as:
RBx;t+1 =
rKx;t+1ux;t+1 + qx;t+1(1  x)  a(ux;t+1)
qx;t
Kx;t+1
At+1
At
Vt+1
Vt
  1 ac
1 ai ;
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knowing from the main model that
rKx;t =
RKx;t
Px;t
A 1t V
1 ac
1 ai
t :
C.5.8 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
Rt 1
R
RhC;t
C
 yt
yt 1
Y i1 R
mp;t;
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
ct + (a(uC;t)
K
C;t
kC;t 1 + a(uI;t)KI;tkI;t 1)
Vt 1
Vt
 1
1 ai = L1 acC;t k
ac
C;t   FC :
Resource constraint in the investment sector:
it = L
1 ai
I;t k
ai
I;t   FI :
Deﬁnition of GDP:
yt = ct + pi;tit +

1  1
et

yt: (C.26)
Moreover
Lt = LI;t + LC;t; it = iC;t + iI;t:
C.6 Steady State
This section describes the model’s steady state.
From the optimal choice of available capital (C.22) and the optimal choice of invest-
ment (C.23) in both sectors:
rKC =

e
1
1 ai gv

  (1  C)

pi; (C.27)
rKI =

e
1
1 ai gv

  (1  I)

pi: (C.28)
From ﬁrm’s price setting in both sectors (C.18),
mcC =
1
1 + Cp
; mcI =
1
1 + Ip
: (C.29)
Using equations (C.29) and imposing knowledge of the steady state expression for rKC and
rKI , one can derive expressions for the steady state wage from the equations that deﬁne
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marginal costs in the two sectors ((C.15) and (C.16)).
Consumption sector:
w =

1
1 + Cp
(1  ac)1 acaacc (rKC ) ac
 1
1 ac
: (C.30)
Investment sector:
w =

1
1 + Ip
(1  ai)1 aiaaii (rKI ) aipi
 1
1 ai
: (C.31)
Since labour can move across sectors the steady state wage has to be the same in the
consumption and investment sector. The equality is veriﬁed by pi. An expression for pi
can be found by setting (C.30) equal to (C.31): 1
1 + Cp
(1  ac)1 acaacc (rKC ) ac
 1
1 ac
=
 1
1 + Ip
(1  ai)1 aiaaii (rKI ) aipi
 1
1 ai
,
 1
1 + Cp
(1  ac)1 acaacc
e 11 ai gv

  (1  C)
 ac
p aci
 1
1 ac
=
 1
1 + Ip
(1  ai)1 aiaaii
e 11 ai gv

  (1  I)
 ai
p aii pi
 1
1 ai
,pi =
1
1+Cp
(1  ac)1 acaacc

e
1
1 ai gv

  (1  C)
 c
h
1
1+Ip
(1  ai)1 aiaaii

e
1
1 ai gv

  (1  I)
 ii 1 ac1 ai : (C.32)
Knowing w, rKC and rKI , the expressions given in (C.17) can be used to ﬁnd the steady
state capital-to-labour ratios in the two sectors:
kC
LC
=
w
rKC
ac
1  ac ; (C.33)
kI
LI
=
w
rKI
ai
1  ac : (C.34)
The zero proﬁt condition for intermediate goods producers in the consumption sector,
c  rKC kC   wLC = 0, and (C.13) imply:
L1 acC k
ac
C   FC   rKC kC   wLC = 0
,FC
LC
=
 kC
LC
ac   rKC kCLC   w:
Analogously the zero proﬁt condition for intermediate goods producers in the investment
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sector, i  rKI kI   wLI = 0, and (C.14) imply:
FI
LI
=
 kI
LI
ai   rKI kILI   w:
These expressions pin down the steady state consumption-to-labour and investment-to-
labour ratios which follow from the intermediate ﬁrms’ production functions ((C.13) and
(C.14)):
c
LC
=
 kC
LC
ac   FC
LC
;
i
LI
=
 kI
LI
ai   FI
LI
:
1 + Cp =
c+ FC
c
, Cp c = FC ; and 1 + Ip =
i+ FI
i
, Ipi = FI :
This and the steady state consumption-to-labour ratio can be used to derive an expression
for steady state consumption:
c =
 kC
LC
ac
LC   FC
,c =
 kC
LC
ac
LC   Cp c
,c = 1
1 + Cp
 kC
LC
ac
LC :
Analogously one can derive an expression for steady state investment:
i =
1
1 + Ip
 kI
LI
ai
LI :
Combining these two expressions leads to,
pi
i
c
=
1
1+Ip
 
kI
LI
aiLI
1
1+Cp
 
kC
LC
ac
LC
pi
,LI
LC
= pi
i
c
1
1+Cp
 
kC
LC
ac
1
1+Ip
 
kI
LI
ai p 1i :
Total labour L is set to unity in the steady state. However, since ai and ac are not
necessarily calibrated to be equal one needs to ﬁx another quantity in addition to L = 1.
We ﬁx the steady state investment-to-consumption ratio, pi ic , which equals 0:399 in the
data. This allows us to derive steady state expressions for labour in the two sectors.
Steady state labour in the investment sector is given by
LI = 1  LC ; (C.35)
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and the two equations above imply that steady state labour in the consumption sector
can be expressed as,
LC =
 
1 + pi
i
c
1
1+Cp
 
kC
LC
ac
1
1+Ip
 
kI
LI
ai p 1i
! 1
: (C.36)
The steady state values for labour in the two sectors imply:
kC =
kC
LC
LC ; kI =
kI
LI
LI ; c =
c
LC
LC ; i =
i
LI
LI ; FC =
FC
LC
LC ; FI =
FI
LI
LI :
It follows from (C.21) that,
kC = kCe
  1
1 ai gv ; and kI = kIe
  1
1 ai gv :
The accumulation equation of available capital (C.24) can be used to solve for investment
in the two sectors:
iC =kC
 
e
1
1 ai gv   (1  C)

; (C.37)
iI =kI
 
e
1
1 ai gv   (1  I)

: (C.38)
From the deﬁnition of GDP (C.26):
y = c+ pii+

1  1
g

y:
From the marginal utility of income (C.20):
 =
1
c  hce ga  ac1 ai gv
  h
ce
ga+
ac
1 ai gv   hc
:
From the household’s wage setting (C.25)
1X
s=0
sswL

w   (1 + w)'L



= 0;
follows the expression for L:
w   (1  w)'L


= 0 ) L =
h w
(1 + w)'
i 1

:
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This expression can be solved for ' to be consistent with L = 1:
1 =
h w
(1 + w)'
i 1

,' = w
1 + w
:
It further holds from equation (C.19) that,
I
C
= e
ga  1 ac1 ai gv
A system of 10 equations (C.27, C.28, C.30, C.32, C.33, C.34, C.35, C.36, C.37, C.38)
can be solved for the 10 steady state variables kC , kI , w, iC , iI , rKC , rKI , LC , LI and pi.
The steady state values for the remaining variables follow from the expressions above.
Given these steady state variables, the remaining steady state values which are mainly
related to ﬁnancial intermediaries can be derived as follows.
The nominal interest rate is given from the Euler equation as,
R =
1

e
ga+
ac
1 ai gvC :
The bank’s stationary stochastic discount factor can be expressed in the steady state as
B = 1:
The steady state borrow in advance constraint implies that
kx = sx:
The steady state price of capital is given by
qx;t = pi;t:
The steady state leverage equation is set equal to it’s average value in the data over the
sample period.
qxsx
nx
= %x = 5:47:
The parameters $ and B help to align the value of the leverage ratio and the corpo-
rate bond spread with their empirical counterparts. Using the calibrated value for B,
the average value for the leverage ratio (5:47) and the weighted quarterly average of
the corporate spreads (RBx   R = 0:5%) allows calibrating $ using the bank’s wealth
accumulation equation,
$ =
h
1  B[(RBx C  R)%x +R]e ga 
ac
1 ai gv
1
C
iqxsx
nx
 1
:
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Given the non-linearity in the leverage ratio, we solve numerically for the steady state
expressions for  and  using,
x = (1  B)Be ga 
ac
1 ai gv(RBx C  R) + Bzx1x;
x = (1  B)Be ga 
ac
1 ai gvR + Bz
x
2x;
with
zx2 =

(RBx C  R)%x +R
 1
C
; and zx1 = z
x
2 ;
and the steady state leverage ratio,
%x =
x
B   x :
C.7 Log-linearized Economy
This section collects the log-linearized model equations. The log-linear deviations of all
variables are deﬁned as
&^t  log &t   log &;
except for
z^t  zt   ga;
v^t  vt   gv;
^Cp;t  log(1 + Cp;t)  log(1 + Cp );
^Ip;t  log(1 + Ip;t)  log(1 + Ip);
^w;t  log(1 + w;t)  log(1 + w):
C.7.1 Firm’s production function and cost minimization
Production function for the intermediate good producing ﬁrm (i) in the consumption
sector:
c^t =
c+ FI
c
[ack^C;t + (1  ac)L^C;t]:
Production function for the intermediate good producing ﬁrm (i) in the investment sector:
i^t =
i+ FI
i
[aik^I;t + (1  ai)L^I;t]:
Capital-to-labour ratios for the two sectors:
r^KC;t   w^t = L^C;t   k^C;t; r^KI;t   w^t = L^I;t   k^I;t: (C.39)
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Marginal cost in both sectors:
m^cC;t = acr^
K
C;t + (1  ac)w^t; m^cI;t = air^KI;t + (1  ai)w^t   p^i;t: (C.40)
C.7.2 Firm’s prices
Price setting equation for ﬁrms that change their price in sector x = C; I:
0 = Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
s
h
~^px;t ~^t;t+s   ^xp;t+s   m^cx;t+s
i)
;
with
~^t;t+s =
sX
k=1
[px^t+k 1   ^t+k]:
Solving for the summation
1
1  p;x ~^px;t =Et
( 1X
s=0
sp;x
s
  ^t;t+s + ^xp;t+s + m^cx;t+s
)
=  ^t;t + ^xp;t + m^cx;t  
p;x
1  p;x ^t;t+1
+ p;xEt
( 1X
s=1
s 1p;x 
s 1  ^t+1;t+s + ^xp;t+s + m^cx;t+s
)
=^xp;t + m^cx;t +
p;x
1  p;xEt

~^px;t+1   ^t;t+1

;
where we used ^t;t = 0.
Prices evolve as
0 = (1  p;x)~^px;t + p;x(px ^t 1   ^);
from which we obtain the Phillips curve in sector x = C; I:
^x;t =

1 + px
Et^x;t+1 +
px
1 + px
^x;t 1 + xm^cx;t + x^xp;t; (C.41)
with x =
(1  p;x)(1  p;x)
p;x(1 + px)
:
From equation (C.19) it follows that
^I;t   ^C;t = p^I;t   p^I;t 1:
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C.7.3 Households
Marginal utility:
^t =
eG
eG   h
"
b^t +

z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t

 
 
eG
eG   h

c^t + z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t

  h
eG   hc^t 1
!#
  h
eG   hEt
"
b^t+1  
 
eG
eG   h

c^t+1 + z^t+1 +
ac
1  ai v^t+1

  h
eG   hc^t
!#
, ^t =1Etc^t+1   2c^t + 3c^t 1 + 4z^t + 5b^t + 6v^t; (C.42)
with
1 =
heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 2 =
e2G + h2
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 3 =
heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ;
4 =
heGz   heG
(eG   h)(eG   h) ; 5 =
eG   hb
eG   h ; 6 =
(heGv   heG) ac1 ai
(eG   h)(eG   h) ;
eG = e
ga+
ac
1 ai gv :
This assumes the shock processes for z^t and b^t.
Euler equation:
^t = R^t + Et

^t+1   z^t+1   v^t+1 ac
1  ai   ^C;t+1

: (C.43)
C.7.4 Investment and Capital
Capital utilization in both sectors:
r^KC;t = C u^C;t; r^
K
I;t = I u^I;t; where x =
a00x(1)
a0x(1)
: (C.44)
Choice of investment for the consumption sector:
q^C;t =e
2( 1
1 ai gv)

i^C;t   i^C;t 1 + 1
1  ai v^t

  e2( 11 ai gv)Et

i^C;t+1   i^C;t + 1
1  ai v^t+1

+ p^i;t; (C.45)
with q^C;t = ^C;t   ^t.
Choice of investment for the investment sector:
q^I;t =e
2( 1
1 ai gv)

i^I;t   i^I;t 1 + 1
1  ai v^t

  e2( 11 ai gv)Et

i^I;t+1   i^I;t + 1
1  ai v^t+1

+ p^i;t; (C.46)
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with q^I;t = ^I;t   ^t.
Capital services input in both sectors:
k^C;t = u^C;t + 
K
C;t +
^kC;t 1   1
1  ai v^t; k^I;t = u^I;t + 
K
I;t +
^kI;t 1   1
1  ai v^t: (C.47)
Capital accumulation in the consumption and investment sector:
^kC;t = (1  C)e 
1
1 ai gv

^kC;t 1 + KC;t  
1
1  ai v^t

+

1  (1  C)e 
1
1 ai gv

i^C;t; (C.48)
^kI;t = (1  I)e 
1
1 ai gv

^kI;t 1 + KI;t  
1
1  ai v^t

+

1  (1  I)e 
1
1 ai gv

i^I;t: (C.49)
C.7.5 Wages
The wage setting equation for workers renegotiating their salary:
0 =Et
n 1X
s=0
sw
s
h
~^wt + ~^
w
t;t+s   ^w;t+s   b^t+s    ~^Lt+s + ^t+s
io
;
with
~^wt;t+s =
sX
k=1
h
w

^c;t+k 1 + z^t+k 1 +
ac
1  ai v^t+k 1

 

^c;t+k + z^t+k +
ac
1  ai v^t+k
i
;
and
~^Lt+s =L^t+s  

1 +
1
w
 
~^wt + ~^
w
t;t+s   w^t+s

:
Then using the labor demand function,
0 =Et
n 1X
s=0
sw
s
h
~^wt + ~^
w
t;t+s   ^w;t+s   b^t+s
  

L^t+s  

1 +
1
w
 
~^wt + ~^
w
t;t+s   w^t+s

+ ^t+s
io
, 0 =Et
n 1X
s=0
sw
s
h
~^wt

1 + 

1 +
1
w

+ ~^wt;t+s   ^w;t+s   b^t+s
  

L^t+s  

1 +
1
w
 
~^wt;t+s   w^t+s

+ ^t+s
io
:
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Solving for the summation,
w
1  w ~^wt =Et
n 1X
s=0
sw
s
h
 

1 + 
 
1 +
1
w

~^wt;t+s +  ^t+s
io
=  w ~^wt;t +  ^t + Et
n 1X
s=0
sw
s
h
  w ~^wt;t+s +  ^t+s
io
= ^t   w
1  ww^
w
t;t+1 + wEt
n 1X
s=0
sw
s[ w^wt+1;t+1+s +  ^t+1+s]
o
= ^t +
w
1  w wEt

~^wt+1   ~^wt;t+1

: (C.50)
where
 ^t  ^w;t + b^t + L^t + 

1 +
1
w

w^t   ^t; (C.51)
w  1 + 

1 +
1
w

;
and recall that ~^wt;t = 0.
Wages evolve as,
w^t = (1  w) ~^wt + w

w^t 1 + w^c;t 1 + w

z^t 1 +
ac
1  ai v^t 1

  ^c;t   z^t   ac
1  ai v^t

,w^t = (1  w) ~^wt + w(w^t 1 + ~^wt;t 1): (C.52)
Equation (C.52) can be solved for ~^wt. This expression, as well as the formulation for  ^t
given in (C.51) can be plugged into equation (C.50). After rearranging this yields the
wage Phillips curve,
w^t =
1
1 + 
w^t 1 +

1 + 
Etw^t+1   wg^w;t + w
1 + 
^c;t 1   1 + w
1 + 
^c;t
+

1 + 
Et^c;t+1 + w^w;t +
w
1 + 
 
z^t 1 +
ac
1  ai v^t 1

  1 + w   z
1 + 
z^t   1 + w   v
1 + 
ac
1  ai v^t: (C.53)
where
w  (1  w)(1  w)
w(1 + )
 
1 + 
 
1 + 1
w
 ;
g^w;t  w^t   (L^t + b^t   ^t):
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C.7.6 Financial sector
The part of the economy concerned with the banking sector is described by the following
equations:
The stochastic discount factor:
^Bt = ^t   ^t 1: (C.54)
Deﬁnition of  for x = C; I:
^x;t =(1  Bzx1 )[^Bt+1   z^t+1  
ac
1  ai v^t+1]
+
1  Bzx1
RBx C  R
[RBx CR^
B
x;t+1 +R
B
x C ^C;t+1  RR^t] + Bzx1 [z^x1;t+1 + ^x;t+1]: (C.55)
Deﬁnition of :
^x;t =(1  Bzx2 )[^Bt+1   z^t+1  
ac
1  ai v^t+1 + R^t]
+ Bz
x
2 [z^
x
2;t+1 + ^t+1]; x = C; I: (C.56)
Deﬁnition of z1:
z^x1;t = %^x;t   %^x;t 1 + z^x2;t; x = C; I: (C.57)
Deﬁnition of z2 for x = C; I:
z^x2;t =
C
(RBx  R)%x +R
[RBx %x[R^
B
x;t + ^C;t] +
R
C
(1  %x)R^t 1 + (RBx C  R)
%x
C
%^x;t 1]  ^C;t:
(C.58)
The leverage ratio:
%^x;t = ^x;t +

B    ^x;t; x = C; I: (C.59)
The leverage equation:
q^x;t + s^x;t = %^x;t + n^x;t: (C.60)
The bank’s wealth accumulation equation
n^x;t =B
%x
C
e
 ga  ac1 ai gv
h
RBx C [R^
B
x;t + ^C;t] +
 1
%x
  1

RR^t 1 + (RBx C  R)%^x;t 1
i
+
B
C
e
 ga  ac1 ai gv [(RBx C  R)%x +R]
h
  z^t   ac
1  ai v^t + n^x;t 1   ^C;t
i
+ (1  B
C
e
 ga  ac1 ai gv [(RBx C  R)%x +R])[q^x;t + s^x;t]; x = C; I: (C.61)
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The borrow in advance constraint:
^kx;t+1 = s^x;t; x = C; I: (C.62)
The bank’s stochastic return on assets in sector x = C; I:
R^Bx;t =
1
rKx + qx(1  x)
[rKx (r^
K
x;t + u^x;t) + qx(1  x)q^x;t]  q^x;t 1 + Kx;t + z^t  
1  ac
1  ai v^t:
(C.63)
Excess (nominal) return:
R^Sx;t =
RBx C
RBx C  R
(R^Bx;t+1 + ^C;t+1) 
R
RBx C  R
R^t; x = C; I: (C.64)
C.7.7 Monetary policy and market clearing
Monetary policy rule:
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)
h
^c;t + Y (y^t   y^t 1)
i
+ ^mp;t (C.65)
Resource constraint in the consumption sector:
c^t +

rKC
kC
c
u^C;t + r
K
I
kI
c
u^I;t

e
  1
1 ai gv =
c+ Fc
c
[ack^C;t + (1  ac)L^C;t] (C.66)
Resource constraint in the investment sector:
i^t =
i+ FI
i
[aik^I;t + (1  ai)L^I;t] (C.67)
Deﬁnition of GDP:
y^t =
c
c+ pii
c^t +
pii
c+ pii
(^it + p^i;t) + e^t: (C.68)
Market clearing:
LC
L
L^C;t +
LI
L
L^I;t = L^t;
iC
i
i^i;t +
iI
i
i^i;t = i^t: (C.69)
C.7.8 Exogenous processes
The 10 exogenous processes of the model can be written in log-linearized form as follows:
Price markup in sector x = C; I:
^xp;t = xp ^
x
p;t 1 + "
x
p;t: (C.70)
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The TFP growth (consumption sector):
z^t = z z^t 1 + "zt : (C.71)
The TFP growth (investment sector):
v^t = vv^t 1 + "vt : (C.72)
Wage markup:
^w;t = w^w;t 1 + "w;t: (C.73)
Preference:
b^t = bb^t 1 + "bt : (C.74)
Monetary policy:
^mp;t = "
mp
t : (C.75)
GDP measurement error:
e^t = ee^t 1 + "et : (C.76)
Capital quality in sector x = C; I:
^Kx;t = K ;x^
K
x;t 1 + "
K
x;t (C.77)
The entire log-linear model is summarized by equations (C.39) - (C.49) and (C.53) -
(C.69) as well as the shock processes (C.70) - (C.77).
C.8 Measurement equations
For estimation model variables are linked with observables using measurement equations.
Letting a superscript "d" denote observable series, then the model’s measurement equa-
tions are as follows:
Real consumption growth,
Cdt  log
 Ct
Ct 1

= log
 ct
ct 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
Real investment growth,
Idt  log
 It
It 1

= log
 it
it 1

+
1
1  ai v^t;
Real wage growth,
W dt  log
 Wt
Wt 1

= log
 wt
wt 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
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Real output growth,
Y dt  log
 Yt
Yt 1

= log
 yt
yt 1

+ z^t +
ac
1  ai v^t;
Consumption sector inﬂation,
dC;t  C;t = ^C;t and ^C;t = log(C;t)  log(C);
Investment sector inﬂation,
dI;t  I;t = ^I;t and ^I;t = log(I;t)  log(I);
Total hours worked,
Ldt  logLt = L^t;
Nominal interest rate (federal funds rate),
Rdt  logRt = log R^t;
Consumption sector corporate spread,
R;dC;t  logRC;t =
RBx C
RBx C  R
(log R^BC;t+1 + log ^C;t+1) 
R
RBx C  R
log R^t;
Investment sector corporate spread,
R;dI;t  logRI;t =
RBx C
RBx C  R
(log R^BI;t+1 + log ^C;t+1) 
R
RBx C  R
log R^t;
Real total equity capital growth,
Ndt  log
 Nt
Nt 1

=e
ga+
ac
1 ai gv
 nC
nC + nI
(n^C;t   n^C;t 1) + nI
nC + nI
(n^I;t   n^I;t 1) + z^t + ac
1  ai v^t

:
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